If opportunistic acquirers can buy targets using overvalued shares, then there is an inefficiency in the merger and acquisition (M&A) market: the most overvalued rather than the highest-synergy bidder may buy the target. We quantify this inefficiency using a structural estimation approach. We find that the M&A market allocates resources efficiently on average. Opportunistic bidders crowd out high-synergy bidders in only 7% of transactions, resulting in an average synergy loss equal to 9% of the target’s value in these inefficient deals. The implied average loss across all deals is 0.63%. Although the inefficiency is small on average, it is large for certain deals, and it is larger when misvaluation is more likely. Even when opportunistic bidders lose the contest, they drive up prices, imposing a large negative externality on the winning synergistic bidders.

The Hou et al. (2015) q-factor model outperforms other factor models in capturing the price-to-high (PTH, the ratio of current price to 52-week high price) anomaly; that is, high-PTH stocks earn high future returns. PTH's relations with future profitability and future investment growth are both significantly positive, and they mirror PTH's relation with future returns in the cross section and by time horizons. Incorporating the information about future investment growth contained in price level variables (e.g., PTH) helps the q factors to capture better those anomalies rooted in future investment growth. Together, these results suggest that the PTH anomaly is consistent with the investment capital asset pricing model.

We examine the notion that financial products which cater to investors’ behavioral biases can yield high trading activity and thus be profitable for issuers. Our setting considers options with a callback feature, namely, callable bull/bear contracts (CBBCs). Such contracts have high skewness when close to callback and thus appeal to cumulative prospect theory preferences. CBBCs with high skewness earn negative average returns, and issuers’ gross profits vary positively with CBBC skewness. Over the 2009–2014 period, issuers earn gross profits of about $1.67 billion by trading CBBCs on the Hang Seng Index. These findings highlight the role of behavioral finance in financial innovation.

Based on high frequency S & P 500 exchange-traded fund (ETF) data from 1993–2013, we show an intraday momentum pattern: the first half-hour return on the market as measured from the previous day’s market close predicts the last half-hour return. This predictability, which is both statistically and economically significant, is stronger on more volatile days, on higher volume days, on recession days, and on major macroeconomic news release days. Intraday momentum also exists for ten other most actively traded domestic and international ETFs. Theoretically, the intraday momentum is consistent not only with Bogousslavsky’s (2016) model of infrequent portfolio rebalancing but also with a model of late-informed trading near the market close.

We use a US Supreme Court case, Morrison v. National Australia Bank (2010), as a natural experiment to test the legal bonding hypothesis. By decreasing the potential liability of US-listed foreign firms, particularly due to class action lawsuits, Morrison arguably eroded their legal bonding to compliance with disclosure duties. Nevertheless, we find evidence of an increase or insignificant change in share values. Tests of longer-run effects of the legal event indicate that foreign firms’ disclosure quality and likelihood of facing enforcement actions remained stable, as did investors’ revealed preferences for trading on US markets. These results go against the legal bonding hypothesis but are consistent with reputational bonding and with market-based accounts of US cross-listing. Our results may contribute to ongoing debate about civil enforcement of securities laws through class actions.