How does common ownership affect innovation? We study this question using project-level data on pharmaceutical startups and their venture capital (VC) investors. We find that common ownership leads VCs to hold back projects, withhold funding, and redirect innovation at lagging startups. Effects are stronger where R&D costs are larger, consistent with common owners aiming to cut duplicate costs. Effects are also stronger where technological similarity is greater and preexisting competition is lower, consistent with common owners seeking market power for their surviving projects. Overall, common VC ownership appears to generate social benefits , via improved innovation efficiency, but also social costs.

We develop a reduced-form approach for valuing callable corporate bonds by characterizing the call probability via an intensity process. Asymmetric information and market frictions justify the existence of a call-arrival intensity from the market's perspective. Our approach both extends the reduced-form model of Duffie and Singleton (1999) for defaultable bonds to callable bonds and captures some important differences between call and default decisions. A comprehensive empirical analysis of callable bonds using both our model and the more traditional American option approach for valuing callable bonds shows that the reduced-form model fits callable bond prices well and that it outperforms the traditional approach both in- and out-of-sample.