We examine parent-subsidiary mergers, transactions that do not entail arm's length bargaining or a change in control. These mergers are typically followed by considerable restructuring of subsidiaries. Minority and parent returns are not significantly different from returns at third party buyouts of parent-controlled subsidiaries, transactions that entail arm's length negotiations and a change in control. Buyer returns are negative, consistent with overbidding. We conclude that parent-subsidiary mergers facilitate corporate restructuring, foster the reallocation of resources toward higher valued uses, and increase value for both parent and subsidiary.

Theories of asset pricing suggest that the amortized cost of the spread is relevant to investors' required returns. The amortized spread measures the spread's cost over investors' holding periods and is approximately equal to the spread times share turnover. We examine amortized spreads for Amex and NYSE stocks over the period 1983–1992. We find that stocks with similar spreads can have vastly different share turnover, and thus, a stock's amortized spread cannot be predicted reliably by its spread alone. Consistent with theories of transaction costs, we find stronger evidence that amortized spreads are priced than we find for unamortized spreads.

This paper analyzes the effect of different IPO mechanisms on the structure of share ownership and explores the role of underpricing and rationing in determining investors’ shareholdings. We focus on the agency problem that results when large institutions are the only investors capable of monitoring the firm whereas small shareholders free-ride on these activities. The major conclusion is that some well-known aspects of IPOs may be explained as rational responses by the issuer to the existence of regulatory constraints in public capital markets. There is a two-stage offering mechanism in which the investment banker, acting in the interests of the issuer, optimally rations the allotment of shares to small investors in order to capture the benefits associated with better monitoring by institutions. Importantly, in our model, the existence of underpricing (and oversubscription) is an indication that the issuer has received a higher ex ante price than would have been obtained through a competitive Walrasian-type offering process.

This paper re-examines the extent to which gains from international diversification are due to differences in industrial structure across countries. Recent papers by Roll (1992), Journal of Finance 47, 3–42 and Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994), Journal of Financial Economics 36, 3–27 investigate this issue and find conflicting evidence. Using a new database, the Dow Jones World Stock Index, with coverage in 25 countries and over 66 industry classifications, we decompose comprehensively both country and industrial sources of variation. We confirm that little of the variation in country index returns can be explained by their industrial composition. We also uncover differences in the proportion of variation in industry index returns that is captured by country and industry factors and discuss the implications for global diversification strategies.

We examine the effects of bank M&As on small business lending using data on over 6000 recent U.S. bank M&As. We are the first to decompose the impact of M&As into the static effects from simply melding the antecedent institutions and the dynamic effects associated with post-M&A refocusing of the consolidated institution. We are also the first to estimate the dynamic reactions of other local banks. We find that the static effects of consolidation reduce small business lending, but are mostly offset by the reactions of other banks, and in some cases also by refocusing efforts of the consolidating institutions themselves.

We examine the reaction of daily Treasury bond prices to the release of U.S. macroeconomic news. These news releases (of employment and producer price index data) are of interest because they are released on periodic, preannounced dates and because they are associated with substantial bond market volatility. We investigate whether these nonautocorrelated announcements give rise to autocorrelated volatility. We find that announcement-day volatility does not persist at all, consistent with the immediate incorporation of information into prices. We also find a risk premium on these release dates.

We document that an SEC investigation of an underwriter imposes indirect penalties on the underwriter and its past clients, particularly IPO clients. Targeted underwriters experience large declines in IPO market share and increased regulatory scrutiny and client risk after an SEC investigation is announced. Stock prices of clients decline significantly. We attribute these effects to a sudden deterioration in the value of the underwriter's reputation capital, suggesting that the general assumption in prior IPO research that underwriter reputation is stationary may be inappropriate. Our results also suggest that the SEC's power to institute investigations should be considered when designing optimal securities regulation.