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Liquidity provision and specialist trading in NYSE-listed non-U.S. stocks

Journal of Financial Economics 2002 63(1), 133-158
We examine how the intrinsic differences between U.S. and non-U.S. stocks affect market participants and the market quality of non-U.S. stocks relative to U.S. stocks. Using proprietary data on NYSE specialist trading, we find that, all else equal, specialist closing inventory positions for non-U.S. stocks are closer to zero than U.S. stocks. The evidence on specialist participation and stabilization rates is mixed. Non-U.S. stocks from developed markets have higher specialist participation and stabilization rates than U.S. stocks, while emerging market stocks have lower participation and stabilization rates than U.S. stocks. With respect to market quality, we find that, all else equal, non-U.S. stocks have wider spreads, less depth, and greater transitory volatility than U.S. stocks. We investigate the reasons behind the difference in liquidity and find that the larger non-U.S. spreads are primarily due to higher information asymmetry and increased adverse selection risk. We conclude that liquidity providers demand greater compensation for trading non-U.S. stocks, but this additional compensation is necessary to offset the higher adverse selection risk.

When a buyback isn’t a buyback: open market repurchases and employee options

Journal of Financial Economics 2002 63(2), 235-261
This paper examines how stock options affect the decision to repurchase shares. Firms announce repurchases when executives have large numbers of options outstanding and when employees have large numbers of options currently exercisable. Once the decision to repurchase is made, the amount repurchased is positively related to total options exercisable by all employees but independent of managerial options. These results are consistent with managers repurchasing both to maximize their own wealth and to fund employee stock option exercises. The market appears to recognize this motive, however, and reacts less positively to repurchases announced by firms with high levels of nonmanagerial options.

Short-term interest rate dynamics: a spatial approach

Journal of Financial Economics 2002 65(1), 73-110
We use new fully functional methods to describe and study the dynamics of the short-term interest rate process in continuous-time. The suggested procedure exploits the spatial properties, embodied in the local time process, of the diffusion of interest, and is robust against deviations from stationarity. Our results indicate that the misspecification of a standard constant elasticity of variance model with linear mean-reverting drift cannot be attributed to the nonlinear behavior of the infinitesimal first moment of the short-term interest rate process at high rates. Rather, it should be attributed to the martingale nature of the process over most of its empirical range (i.e., between 3% and about 15%).

Short-sale constraints and stock returns

Journal of Financial Economics 2002 66(2-3), 207-239
Stocks can be overpriced when short-sale constraints bind. We study the costs of short-selling equities from 1926 to 1933, using the publicly observable market for borrowing stock. Some stocks are sometimes expensive to short, and it appears that stocks enter the borrowing market when shorting demand is high. We find that stocks that are expensive to short or which enter the borrowing market have high valuations and low subsequent returns, consistent with the overpricing hypothesis. Size-adjusted returns are 1–2% lower per month for new entrants, and despite high costs it is profitable to short them.

Divestitures and the liquidity of the market for corporate assets

Journal of Financial Economics 2002 64(1), 117-144
The liquidity of the market for corporate assets plays an important role in explaining whether a firm divests a business segment, which segment the firm divests, and whether it divests a core segment or an unrelated segment. Firms are more likely to divest segments from industries with a more liquid market for corporate assets, unrelated segments, poorly performing segments, and small segments. Strikingly, the segment with the least liquid market is less likely to be divested than the best-performing segment, while the worst-performing segment is less likely to be divested than the segment with the most liquid market.