This is a first attempt to study how the structure of the industry affects mutual fund behavior. I show that industry structure matters; the mutual fund families employ strategies that rely on the heterogeneity of the investors in terms of investment horizon by offering the possibility to switch across different funds belonging to the same family at no cost. I argue that this option acts as an externality for all the funds belonging to the same family, affecting the target level of performance the family wants to reach and the number of funds it wants to set up. By using the universe of the U.S. mutual fund industry, I empirically confirm this intuition. I find evidence of family driven heterogeneity among funds and show that families actively exploit it. I argue that the more families are able to differentiate themselves in terms of non-performance-related characteristics, the less they need to compete in terms of performance. Product differentiation—i.e., the dispersion in the “services” (fees, performance) that the competing funds offer—affects performance and fund proliferation. In particular, I show that the degree of product differentiation negatively affects performance and positively affects fund proliferation.

We study how information flows within financial conglomerates by analyzing the relations between mutual funds and banks that belong to the same financial group. We investigate the effect that the lending behavior of affiliated banks has on the portfolio choice of the mutual funds that are part of the same group. We show that funds (fund families) increase their stakes in the firms that borrow from their affiliated banks in the period following the deal by far greater amounts than other unaffiliated funds (fund families). We provide evidence that this strategy is information-driven. The performance of the positions of affiliated funds in the stocks of borrowing firms exceeds that of their other positions in nonborrowing stocks located in the same industry as well as that of other stocks having similar characteristics by up to 1.6% per month. Funds increase (decrease) their stock holdings in those borrowing stocks that subsequently provide positive (negative) abnormal returns, suggesting that they exploit privileged inside information not available to other market participants. This behavior is prevalent largely in funds located in close geographic proximity to their lending banks. Furthermore, it is exhibited mostly by young, small, and poorly performing fund families. Our evidence points to information flows within conglomerates through informal channels such as personal acquaintances.

We study the impact of “style investing” on the market for corporate control. We argue that the choice of the bidder is influenced by the fact that the merge with a firm that belongs to an investment style more popular with the market may boost the bidder's value. By using data on the flows in mutual funds, we construct a measure of popularity, which relies directly on the identification of sentiment-induced investor demand, rather than being a direct transformation of stock market data. We show that differences in popularity between bidder and target help to explain their pairing. The merger with a more popular target generates a halo effect from the target to the bidder that induces the market to evaluate the assets of the less popular bidder at the (inflated) market value of the more popular target. Both bidder and target premiums are positively related to the difference in popularity between the target and the bidder. However, the target's ability to appropriate the gain is reduced by the fact that its bargaining position is weaker when the bidder's potential for asset appreciation is higher. We document a better short- and medium-term performance of less popular firms taking over more popular firms. The bidder managers engaging in these cosmetic mergers take advantage of the window of opportunity induced by the deal to reduce their stake in the firm under convenient conditions.

We investigate how ownership patterns affect the way the firm is monitored, the liquidity of its shares, and its stock price. We show that informed ownership improves governance and induces value-enhancing decisions (less over-investment and fewer but better acquisitions). At the same time, it increases the adverse selection discount required by less informed investors to trade, reducing the firm's liquidity. Both effects are impounded in the stock price. This explains why ownership seems to be unrelated to performance. Informed investors affect prices in opposite directions: monitoring would raise prices, but the lower liquidity induced by their presence would reduce them.

We examine the effect of the bond capital supply uncertainty of institutional investors (e.g., mutual bond funds and insurance companies) on the leverage of the firm using a novel data set. Our main finding is that the supply uncertainty of the firm's bond investor base — measured as (i) the average portfolio turnover, or (ii) the average flow volatility of investors holding the firm's bonds, or (iii) the prevalence of mutual funds among the firm's bondholders as opposed to insurance companies — has a negative and significant effect on the leverage of the firm. The supply uncertainty of the firm's bond investor base also has a negative and significant effect on the firm's probability of issuing bonds, and a positive and significant effect on the firm's probability of issuing equity and borrowing from banks. We take a multi-pronged approach to address potential endogeneity issues, including use of geography-based instruments and firm fixed effects, subsample analyses, and a placebo test. Our results highlight the fragility of access to the bond market for companies that depend on mutual funds with high turnover/ flow volatility as primary bond investors.

Using novel data on investors' bond portfolios, we study the contagion of the crisis from securitized bonds to corporate bonds. When securitized bonds became “toxic” in August 2007, mutual funds retained the now illiquid securitized bonds and sold corporate bonds. Funds with negative flows or high liquidity needs liquidated more than others. Yield spreads increased more for corporate bonds whose pre-crisis bondholders were more heavily exposed to securitized bonds, compared to same-issuer bonds held by unexposed investors. The findings suggest that liquidity-constrained investors with exposure to securitized bonds played a role in propagating the crisis from securitized to corporate bonds.

We study the choice between named and anonymous mutual fund managers. We argue that fund families weigh the benefits of naming managers against the cost associated with their increased future bargaining power. Named managers receive more media mentions, have greater inflows, and suffer less return diversion due to within family cross-subsidization, but departures of named managers reduce net flows. Naming managers became less common between 1993 and 2004. This was especially true in the asset classes and cities most affected by the hedge fund boom, which increased outside opportunities for, and the cost of retaining, successful named managers.

Firms in global markets often belong to business groups. We argue that this feature can have a profound influence on international asset pricing. In bad times, business groups may strategically reallocate risk across affiliated firms to protect core “central firms.” This strategic behavior induces co-movement among central firms, creating a new intertemporal risk factor. Based on a novel data set of worldwide ownership for 2002–2012, we find that central firms are better protected in bad times and that they earn relatively lower expected returns. Moreover, a centrality factor augments traditional models in explaining the cross section of international stock returns.

The existing literature treats the short side (i.e., short selling) and the long side of hedge fund trading (i.e., fund holdings) independently. The two sides, however, complement each other: opposite changes in the two are likely to be driven by information, whereas simultaneous increases (decreases) of the two may be motivated by hedging (unwinding) considerations. We use this intuition to identify informed demand and document that it exhibits highly significant predictive power over returns (approximately 10% per year). We also find that informed demand forecasts future firm fundamentals, suggesting that hedge funds play an important role in information discovery.

We study the link between a firm's quality of governance and its alliance activity. We consider alliances as a commitment technology that helps a company’ Chief Executive Officer overcome agency problems that relate to the inability to ex ante motivate division managers. We show that well-governed firms are more likely to avail themselves of this technology to anticipate ex post commitment problems and resolve them. The role of governance is particularly important when the commitment problems are more acute, such as for significantly risky/long-horizon projects (“longshots”) or firms more prone to inefficient internal redistribution of resources (conglomerates), as well as in the absence of alternative disciplining devices (e.g., low product market competition). Governance also mitigates agency issues between alliance partners; dominant alliance partners agree to a more equal split of power with junior partners that are better governed. An “experiment” that induces cross-sectional variation in the cost of the alliance commitment technology provides evidence of a causal link between governance and alliances.