This paper shows that exposure to aggregate distress risk is the underlying source of the premiums for the Fama-French size (SMB) and value (HML) factors. Using a unique data set of aggregate business failures of both private and public firms from 1926 to 1997, I build portfolios that track news about future firm failures. These tracking portfolios optimally hedge aggregate distress risk and earn a Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) alpha of approximately −4% a year. Both HML and SMB predict changes in future failure rates. Small stocks have lower returns than large stocks and value stocks have lower returns than growth stocks when the market expects an increase in future failure rates. Finally, a two-factor model with the market and the tracking portfolio for aggregate distress as factors does as well as the Fama-French three-factor model in pricing the 25 size and book-to-market sorted portfolios.

We show that idiosyncratic jumps are a key determinant of mean stock returns from both an ex post and ex ante perspective. Ex post, the entire annual average return of a typical stock accrues on the four days on which its price jumps. Ex ante, idiosyncratic jump risk earns a premium: a value-weighted weekly long-short portfolio that buys (sells) stocks with high (low) predicted jump probabilities earns annualized mean returns of 9.4% and four-factor alphas of 8.1%. This strategy’s returns are larger when there are greater limits to arbitrage. These results are consistent with investor aversion to idiosyncratic jump risk.

Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) show that firms with a high probability of default have abnormally low average future returns. We show that firms with a high potential for default (death) also tend to have a relatively high probability of extremely large (jackpot) payoffs. Consistent with an investor preference for skewed, lottery-like payoffs, stocks with high predicted probabilities for jackpot returns earn abnormally low average returns. Stocks with high death or jackpot probabilities have relatively low institutional ownership and the jackpot effect we find is much stronger in stocks with high limits to arbitrage.

We examine the ability of ratings and market-based measures to predict defaults. Although market-based measures are more accurate at horizons up to one year, ratings complement market-based measures and are not redundant in predicting defaults across horizons. Market-based measures differ from ratings in that they respond to both cash-flow and discount-rate news, while ratings respond primarily to cash-flow news, which is more informative of future defaults. Ratings ignore transitory shocks to credit risk, while market-based measures do not. Rating agencies respond to transitory shocks with watches rather than downgrades. Ratings are more informative during expansions and for speculative grade firms.