To make high-quality research more accessible and easier to explore.

Fields:
5 results ✕ Clear filters

Stock return variances

Journal of Financial Economics 1986 17(1), 5-26
Asset prices are much more volatile during exchange trading hours than during non-trading hours. This paper considers three explanations for this phenomenon: (1) volatility is caused by public information which is more likely to arrive during normal business hours; (2) volatility is caused by private information which affects prices when informed investors trade; and (3) volatility is caused by pricing errors that occur during trading. Although a significant fraction of the daily variance is caused by mispricing, the behavior of returns around exchange holidays suggests that private information is the principle factor behind high trading-time variances.

The puzzling price behavior of treasury bills that mature at the turn of calendar months

Journal of Financial Economics 1986 16(2), 267-283
This paper documents the unusual price behavior of Treasury bills that mature at the turn of calendar months. There is a kink in the yield curve as it crosses calendar months, and this kink is most pronounced as the yield curve crosses between calendar years. Potential seasonality in the spot rate of interest could not explain these results, nor could they be explained by the ‘mispricing’ of either the last bill or first bill in a month. The exceptionally large premium on the first bill in a month tended to be earned throughout the lifetime of the bill.

Investment banking, reputation, and the underpricing of initial public offerings

Journal of Financial Economics 1986 15(1-2), 213-232 open access
This paper develops and tests two propositions. We demonstrate that there is a monotone relation between the (expected) underpricing of an initial public offering and the uncertainty of investors regarding its value. We also argue that the resulting underpricing equilibrium is enforced by investment bankers, who have reputation capital at stake. An investment banker who ‘cheats’ on this underpricing equilibrium will lose either potential investors (if it doesn't underprice enough) or issuers (if it underprices too much), and thus forfeit the value of its reputation capital. Empirical evidence supports our propositions.

Non-trading, market making, and estimates of stock price volatility

Journal of Financial Economics 1986 15(3), 359-372 open access
We examine the effects of market making and intermittent trading on estimates of stock price volatility. When observed price changes are correctly tied to a stock's true price dynamics, it is found that non-trading per se causes a loss of efficiency but no bias in traditional volatility estimates. Non-trading induces substancial inefficiency in the extreme value estimator of volatility which it biases downward. Market making's effects add to the non-trading induced inefficiency in the traditional estimator, while information trading causes a downward bias, and liquidity trading a potentially removable upward bias, in that estimator.

Capital raising, underwriting and the certification hypothesis

Journal of Financial Economics 1986 15(1-2), 261-281
This paper develops a theory of the role of the underwriter in certifying that risky issue prices reflect potentially adverse inside information. The theory derives from the literature on the use of reputational capital to guarantee product quality. An underwriting cost/benefit paradigm is employed to generate testable implications related to announcement effects, issue underpricing, the choice of competitive versus negotiated underwriting, and the level of underwriter compensation as a function of firm-specific information. Existing empirical literature is reviewed in the context of the certification hypothesis and several new tests are conducted. All of the findings are supportive of the hypothesis.