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Were Japanese stock prices too high?

Journal of Financial Economics 1991 29(2), 337-363 open access
This paper asks whether market fundamentals can explain the recent run-up and decline of Japanese equity values and price-earnings ratios. Accounting differences explain about half of the long-run disparity between U.S. and Japanese P/Es. For example, if Japanese firms used U.S. accounting rules, the Japanese P/E ratio would have been 32.6, not 53.7, in 1989. Accounting differences cannot, however, explain the doubling of this ratio in 1986, nor its decline in 1990. Similarly, we are unable to isolate changes in required stock returns or growth expectations that are large enough to explain recent Japanese stock price movements.

Underwriter warrants, underwriter compensation, and the costs of going public

Journal of Financial Economics 1991 29(1), 113-135
Warrants are sometimes granted to underwriters in initial public offerings as part of the compensation for their services. We examine the effects of underwriter warrants in a sample of firm commitment offerings from 1983 through 1987. These warrants represent a significant component of the compensation to the underwriter and are associated with greater total costs of going public. Warrants appear to provide a mechanism for circumventing otherwise binding regulatory constraints, allowing issuers to offer extra compensation to underwriters marketing especially risky offerings.

Underwritten calls of convertible bonds

Journal of Financial Economics 1991 29(1), 173-196
Common-stock prices fall a statistically significant 2 percent in response to underwritten convertible debt call announcements. We find that the significant negative price reaction is confined to underwritten calls — stock-price responses to non-underwritten calls average an insignificant −0.84 percent. The results support the idea that managers are more likely to use underwriters the more unfavorable the information they possess about future firm cash flows. An agency cost interpretation of underwritten calls is also consistent with the results, but is not supported by management ownership and corporate liquidity evidence.