Despite empirical evidence pointing to a strong similarity between lease contracts and junk bonds, the theoretical modeling of equilibrium lease determination has been confined primarily to default-free leases. This paper provides a unified framework for determining the equilibrium credit spread on leases subject to default risk. The model is flexible enough to be applied to a wide variety of real-world leasing structures, including security deposits, required up-front prepayments, embedded lease options, leases indexed to use, and lease credit insurance contracts.

This paper focuses on how best to measure the corporate marginal tax rate, which is an important input into financial analysis of the cost of capital, financing policy, corporate hedging, and corporate reorganizations. The results indicate that the simulated tax rate used by Shevlin (1990) and Graham (1996), although difficult to calculate, is the best available proxy for the ‘true’ marginal tax rate. If the simulated rate is unavailable, an easy-to-calculate trichotomous variable or the statutory marginal tax rate (which captures the progressivity in the tax schedule) are reasonable alternatives, better than most commonly used tax variables.

We analyze the advice contained in a sample of 237 investment newsletter strategies over 1980-1992. Each newsletter strategy recommends a mix of equity and cash. We find no evidence that letters systematically increase equity weights before market rises or decrease weights before market declines. While there is no information in the newsletter strategies about future market returns, we document that disagreement among the newsletters is correlated with future realized and implied volatility.

We develop an explanation for IPO underpricing in which the issuer's demand for ownership dispersion creates an incentive to underprice. Promoting oversubscription allows broad initial ownership, which in turn increases secondary-market liquidity. Increased liquidity reduces the required return to investors. Broad initial ownership, however, requires an increase in investor-borne information costs. These information costs are offset through initial underpricing. Empirical results are consistent with initial underpricing reflecting the level of ownership dispersion.

We examine the evidence that expected security returns can be forecasted by the term premium, default premium, and dividend yield, in light of recent findings that similar security return patterns are associated with Federal Reserve monetary policy developments. We extend Fama and French's (1989) analysis by suggesting that the monetary environment influences investors' required returns, and hence the robustness of the models they propose. Our findings indicate that Fama and French's results vary dramatically across monetary environments; that is, the behavior of the business-conditions proxies and their influence on expected security returns is significantly affected by the monetary sector.

We investigate factors affecting the number of outside directorships held by CEOs. CEOs of firms with growth opportunities hold fewer outside directorships than CEOs of firms consisting primarily of assets-in-place. We find evidence consistent with CEOs holding more outside directorships as they transfer decision rights to their eventual successors. We also find that when employees (not necessarily CEOs) of two different firms sit on each other's boards, CEOs hold more outside directorships, suggesting CEO participation bonds the relationship between the two firms. We find little evidence that outside directorships represent unchecked perquisite consumption on the part of CEOs.

Stock splits should have no effect on firm value in perfect capital markets, yet stock prices increase on split announcements. The two traditional explanations are information signaling and improved liquidity for shares that trade at lower prices. We investigate these explanations by studying splits of American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) that are not associated with splits in their home-country stock, and which represent unique illustrations of the effect of liquidity. We interpret our findings as supportive of the liquidity explanation of stock split announcement effects.

Execution costs, as measured by the quoted spread, the effective spread (which accounts for trades inside the quotes), the realized spread (which measures revenues of suppliers of immediacy), the Roll (1984) implied spread, and the post-trade variability, are twice as large for a sample of NASDAQ stocks as they are for a matched sample of NYSE stocks. The difference is not due to differences in adverse information, in market depth, or in the frequency of even-eighth quotes. Partial explanations are provided by differences in the treatment of limit orders and commissions in the two markets. We conclude that important explanations are the internalization and preferencing of order flow and the presence of alternative interdealer trading systems, factors that limit dealers' incentives to narrow spreads on NASDAQ.

Do taxes affect corporate debt policy? This paper tests whether the incremental use of debt is positively related to simulated firm-specific marginal tax rates that account for net operating losses, investment tax credits, and the alternative minimum tax. The simulated marginal tax rates exhibit substantial variation due to the dynamics of the tax code, tax regime shifts, business cycle effects, and the progressive nature of the statutory tax schedule. Using annual data from more than 10,000 firms for the years 1980–1992, I provide evidence which indicates that high-tax-rate firms issue more debt than their low-tax-rate counterparts.