Theories of asset pricing suggest that the amortized cost of the spread is relevant to investors' required returns. The amortized spread measures the spread's cost over investors' holding periods and is approximately equal to the spread times share turnover. We examine amortized spreads for Amex and NYSE stocks over the period 1983–1992. We find that stocks with similar spreads can have vastly different share turnover, and thus, a stock's amortized spread cannot be predicted reliably by its spread alone. Consistent with theories of transaction costs, we find stronger evidence that amortized spreads are priced than we find for unamortized spreads.

A greater threat of takeover has two opposing effects on managerial compensation. The competition effect in the market for managers reduces compensation. The risk effect increases compensation by making managers' implicitly deferred compensation and firm-specific human capital less secure. Using a sample of about 450 large firms, we find that an increase in the threat of takeover from the first to the third quartile reduces a typical CEO's salary and bonus by 22,800–211,600 due to the competition effect, but raises salary and bonus by 41,500–255,300 due to the risk effect. The net effect is an increase of $18,700–43,700.

The abolition and reinstatement of the forward trading facility (Badla) on the Bombay Stock Exchange is used to study the effect of short-term traders on share prices and liquidity. The reactions of stock prices to the ban reveal an average negative abnormal return of 15% on Badla stocks as compared to the non-Badla stocks. The ensuing period shows a significant decline in the liquidity of the Badla Stocks related to the announcement period CARs. Our results suggest that the market perceives short-term traders as playing a significant positive role, with a larger benefit accruing to the relatively less-liquid stocks.

We document that an SEC investigation of an underwriter imposes indirect penalties on the underwriter and its past clients, particularly IPO clients. Targeted underwriters experience large declines in IPO market share and increased regulatory scrutiny and client risk after an SEC investigation is announced. Stock prices of clients decline significantly. We attribute these effects to a sudden deterioration in the value of the underwriter's reputation capital, suggesting that the general assumption in prior IPO research that underwriter reputation is stationary may be inappropriate. Our results also suggest that the SEC's power to institute investigations should be considered when designing optimal securities regulation.

Previous research finds the volatility implied by S&P 100 index option prices to be a biased and inefficient forecast of future volatility and to contain little or no incremental information beyond that in past realized volatility. In contrast, we find that implied volatility outperforms past volatility in forecasting future volatility and even subsumes the information content of past volatility in some of our specifications. Our results differ from previous studies because we use longer time series and nonoverlapping data. A regime shift around the October 1987 crash explains why implied volatility is more biased in previous work.