Current research shows that firms are more likely to benchmark against peers that pay their Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) higher compensation, reflecting self serving behavior. We propose an alternative explanation: the choice of highly paid peers represents a reward for unobserved CEO talent. We test this hypothesis by decomposing the effect of peer selection into talent and self serving components. Consistent with our prediction, we find that the association between a firm's selection of highly paid peers and CEO pay mostly represents compensation for CEO talent.

This paper investigates whether the U.S. repatriation tax for U.S. multinational corporations affects foreign investment. Our results show that the locked-out cash due to repatriation tax costs is associated with a higher likelihood of foreign (but not domestic) acquisitions. We also find a negative association between tax-induced foreign cash holdings and the market reaction to foreign deals. This result suggests that the investment activity of firms with high repatriation tax costs is viewed by the market as less value-enhancing than that of firms with low tax costs, consistent with foreign investment of firms with high repatriation tax costs possibly reflecting agency-driven behavior.