The paper examines the effect of investment frictions on leverage dynamics, using a model of a firm whose investment projects are (1) indivisible and lumpy, and (2) subject to time-to-build. Regressions on the model-simulated data demonstrate that investment frictions can provide alternative interpretations of the observed leverages shown in the empirical literature. Cross-sectional analysis of firms in the oil and gas extraction industries, as well as analysis across all industries, reveals the evidence that small firms have more volatile investments and longer time-to-build, which may explain the observed differences in leverage dynamics across small and large firms.

Managers frequently cite the desire to mitigate asymmetric information as a motivation for increasing firm focus. The information benefits of focus appear relevant for the subset of firms that actually increase their focus; however, the relevance of focus-related information benefits for the population of diversified firms is an open question. This paper examines the relation between corporate diversification and asymmetric information proxies derived from analysts’ forecasts and abnormal returns associated with earnings announcements. I find that greater diversification is not associated with increased asymmetric information. These results call into question the notion that corporate diversification strictly exacerbates information problems.

This paper derives a multibeta representation theorem for pricing assets using arbitrary reference variables that are not necessarily the true factors. Under this theorem, the upper bound on pricing deviations depends upon the correlations not only between the reference variables and the factors but also between the reference variables and the residual risks. A new concept of a well-diversified variable is introduced, which though free of residual risk, may be less than perfectly correlated with the true factors. Welldiversified variables correlated with the factors play a key role in the pricing of assets, since these variables can replace the factors without any loss in pricing accuracy under all linear asset pricing theories.

Differences among bidder type-specific outcomes of asset sales are theoretically related to differences in bidders’ valuations and participation. The lead application to quantify these relations is takeover auctions: bidders are classified into strategic and financial, and bids are available. I structurally estimate valuations from all bids. The positive difference in premiums between strategic and financial acquirers is driven by the difference in dispersions of valuations (e.g., strategic bidders’ synergies are more dispersed) and the set of auction participants. The difference in average valuations is relatively unimportant. My approach can help explain outcomes of asset sales, even in settings with limited bidder data.

This paper examines how well alternate time-changed Lévy processes capture stochastic volatility and the substantial outliers observed in U.S. stock market returns over the past 85 years. The autocorrelation of daily stock market returns varies substantially over time, necessitating an additional state variable when analyzing historical data. I estimate various one- and two-factor stochastic volatility/Lévy models with time-varying autocorrelation via extensions of the Bates (2006) methodology that provide filtered daily estimates of volatility and autocorrelation. The paper explores option pricing implications, including for the Volatility Index (VIX) during the recent financial crisis.

This paper documents average acquisition discounts for stand-alone private firms and subsidiaries of other firms (unlisted targets) of 15% to 30% relative to acquisition multiples for comparable publicly traded targets. My results are strongly consistent with the notion that sale prices for unlisted targets are affected by both the need for, and availability of, the liquidity provided by the buyer. Corporate parents are significantly liquidity-constrained prior to the sale of a subsidiary, particularly when the subsidiary is being sold for cash. Furthermore, acquisition discounts are significantly greater when debt capital is relatively more expensive to obtain, and when the parent firm has below-market stock returns in the 12 months prior to the sale.

Using a comprehensive database of headlines about individual companies, I examine monthly returns following public news. I compare them to stocks with similar returns, but no identifiable public news. There is a difference between the two sets. I find strong drift after bad news. Investors seem to react slowly to this information. I also find reversal after extreme price movements unaccompanied by public news. The separate patterns appear even after adjustments for risk exposure and other effects. They are, however, mainly seen in smaller, more illiquid stocks. These findings support some integrated theories of investor over- and underreaction.

The paper provides evidence on the effects of including a target termination fee in a merger contract. I test the implications of the hypothesis that termination fees are used by self-interested target managers to deter competing bids and protect “sweetheart” deals with white knight bidders, presumably resulting in lower premiums for target shareholders. An alternative hypothesis is that target managers use termination fees to encourage bidder participation by ensuring that the bidder is compensated for the revelation of valuable private information released during merger negotiations. My empirical evidence demonstrates that merger deals with target termination fees involve significantly higher premiums and success rates than deals without such clauses. Furthermore, only weak support is found for the contention that termination fees deter competing bids. Overall, the evidence suggests that termination fee use is at least not harmful, and is likely beneficial, to target shareholders.

This paper reassesses the apparent systematic underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs). Investigation of the distribution of initial returns following IPOs shows that positive mean initial returns may reflect the existence of a partially unobserved left (negative) tail. Moreover, most IPOs with zero one-day returns subsequently fall in price, suggesting that underwriter price support may account for the skewed distribution and hence the phenomenon of positive average initial IPO returns, even if offering prices are set at expected market value. This paper thus challenges the presumption underlying previous research that positive average initial IPO returns result primarily from deliberate underpricing.