Several studies of mergers and tender offers examine the changes in the value of ownership claims associated with corporate acquisitions and use the observed value changes to address the degree of competition in the market for corporate acquisitions. These studies conclude that the takeover market is competitive on the basis of the abnormal stock price changes of bidding firms, the time series behavior of the market value of target firms, and the proportion of gains that accrue to target and bidding firms. Unfortunately, none of these tests are sufficient to conclude that the takeover market is competitive. A competitive acquisition market implies that the potential gain to unsuccessful bidders at the successful offer price is nonpositive. This implication is tested using data on tender offers in which there are multiple bidders. The results appear to be consistent with competition in the market for corporate acquisitions.

This paper reviews much of the scientific literature on the market for corporate control. The evidence indicates that corporate takeovers generate positive gains, that target firm shareholders benefit, and that bidding firm shareholders do not lose. The gains created by corporate takeovers do not appear to come from the creation of market power. With the exception of actions that exclude potential bidders, it is difficult to find managerial actions related to corporate control that harm shareholders. Finally, we argue the market for corporate control is best viewed as an arena in which managerial teams compete for the rights to manage corporate resources.

This paper describes the relation among a variety of asset leasing contracts, including: (1) cancellable operating leases; (2) leases which grant the lesse an option to extend the life of the lease; (3) leases that grant the lessee an option to purchase the leased asset at a fixed price at the maturity date of the lease; (4) leases that grant the lessee the right to purchase the leased asset at its ‘fair market value’ at the maturity date of the lease; (5) leases that grant an option to the lessee to purchase the leased asset at a prespecified price anytime during the life of the lease; (6) leases that require the lessee to purchase the leased asset at a fixed price at the maturity date of the lease; and (7) leases that contain non-cancellation provisions. The paper uses a compound option pricing framework to develop a general model for valuing (or evaluating) each of the types of leasing contracts. Numerical examples are presented to illustrate the effect of the various elements of a leasing contract — including cancellation risk and residual value risk — on equilibrium rental payments.