Within diversified firms, the negative impact of leverage on investment is significantly greater for high q than for low q segments and significantly greater for non-core than for core segments. This differs substantially from focused firms and is consistent with the view that diversified firms allocate a disproportionate share of their debt service burden to their higher q and non-core segments. We also find that, among low-growth firms, the positive relation between leverage and firm value is significantly weaker in diversified firms than in focused firms. We conclude that the disciplinary benefits of debt are partially offset by the additional managerial discretion in allocating debt service that is provided by the diversified organizational structure.

We investigate the role of “arbitrageurs,” who exploit price discrepancies between redundant securities. Arbitrage opportunities arise endogenously in an economy populated by rational, heterogeneous investors facing investment restrictions. We show that an arbitrageur alleviates these restrictions and improves the transfer of risk amongst investors. When the arbitrageur behaves noncompetitively, taking into account the price impact of his trades, he optimally limits the size of his positions due to his decreasing marginal profits. When the arbitrageur is subject to margin requirements and is endowed with capital from outside investors, the size of his trades and capital are endogenously determined in equilibrium.

Recent studies suggest that the conditional CAPM holds, period by period, and that time-variation in risk and expected returns can explain why the unconditional CAPM fails. In contrast, we argue that variation in betas and the equity premium would have to be implausibly large to explain important asset-pricing anomalies like momentum and the value premium. We also provide a simple new test of the conditional CAPM using direct estimates of conditional alphas and betas from short-window regressions, avoiding the need to specify conditioning information. The tests show that the conditional CAPM performs nearly as poorly as the unconditional CAPM, consistent with our analytical results.

We study the stock market's reaction to aggregate earnings news. Prior research shows that, for individual firms, stock prices react positively to earnings news but require several quarters to fully reflect the information in earnings. We find a substantially different pattern in aggregate data. First, returns are unrelated to past earnings, suggesting that prices neither underreact nor overreact to aggregate earnings news. Second, aggregate returns correlate negatively with concurrent earnings; over the last 30 years, for example, stock prices increased 5.7% in quarters with negative earnings growth and only 2.1% otherwise. This finding suggests that earnings and discount rates move together over time and provides new evidence that discount-rate shocks explain a significant fraction of aggregate stock returns.

Recent corporate debt offerings have included a covenant specifying a pre-determined payment to debtholders when the debt is downgraded. We examine the incentive for equityholders to increase firm risk (and the associated costs) when debt includes a “rating trigger.” Equityholders of firms with a low-risk profile and operating flexibility choose debt with a trigger, while equityholders of firms with a high-risk profile and less flexibility choose regular debt. A trigger that requires an equity infusion better mitigates conflicts between equityholders and debtholders than a trigger paid by liquidating assets. A trigger that increases the coupon rate is not optimal.

If investors are myopic mean-variance optimizers, a stock's expected return is linearly related to its beta in the cross-section. The slope of the relation is the cross-sectional price of risk, which should equal the expected equity premium. We use this simple observation to forecast the equity-premium time series with the cross-sectional price of risk. We also introduce novel statistical methods for testing stock-return predictability based on endogenous variables whose shocks are potentially correlated with return shocks. Our empirical tests show that the cross-sectional price of risk (1) is strongly correlated with the market's yield measures and (2) predicts equity-premium realizations, especially in the first half of our 1927–2002 sample.

This paper investigates the equity investments and voting rights that American banks control through their trust business. The paper also studies whether the voting rights American banks control through their trust business help explain their presence on firms’ corporate boards. We find that on average the largest 100 American banks control 10% of the voting rights of S&P 500 firms. We also find that there are several firms in the S&P 500 index in which the top banks control more than 20% of their voting rights, and several firms in the country in which these banks control more than 60% of their voting rights. Our investigation into the presence of American bankers on corporate boards shows that bankers are more likely to join the boards of firms in which they control a large voting stake. We also find that banks’ lending relationships help explain bankers’ board memberships. Our results further show that bankers who have both a voting stake in a firm and a lending relationship with it have a higher likelihood of joining the firm's board of directors.

Morck, Yeung and Yu show that R2 is higher in countries with less developed financial systems and poorer corporate governance. We show how control rights and information affect the division of risk bearing between managers and investors. Lack of transparency increases R2 by shifting firm-specific risk to managers. Opaque stocks with high R2s are also more likely to crash, that is, to deliver large negative returns. Using stock returns from 40 stock markets from 1990 to 2001, we find strong positive relations between R2 and several measures of opaqueness. These measures also explain the frequency of crashes.

We examine the extent to which firms from different countries rely on alternative sources of capital, the locations in which they raise capital, and the factors that affect these choices. During the 1990–2001 period, firms raised about 25.3 trillion of new capital, including 4.9 trillion from abroad. International debt issuances are substantially more common than equity issuances, with debt (equity) issues accounting for 87% (9%) of all securities issued internationally, and about 20% (12%) of all public debt issuances. Market timing considerations appear to be important in security issuance decisions in most countries.

This paper examines the shareholder wealth effects of bids by controlling shareholders seeking to acquire the remaining minority equity stake in a firm, deals commonly referred to as minority freeze-outs. Minority claimants in freeze-out offers receive an allocation of deal surplus at the bid announcement that exceeds their pro rata claim on the firm. An analysis of bid outcomes and renegotiation indicates that minority claimants and their agents exercise significant bargaining power during freeze-out proposals. Overall, our results suggest that legal standards and economic incentives are sufficient to deter self-dealing by controllers during freeze-out bids.