This paper focuses on funds of funds (FOFs) as a form of financial intermediation in private equity (both buyout and venture capital). After accounting for fees, FOFs provide returns equal to or above public market indices for both buyout and venture capital. While FOFs focusing on buyouts outperform public markets, they underperform direct fund investment strategies in buyout. In contrast, the average performance of FOFs in venture capital is on a par with results from direct venture fund investing. This suggests that FOFs in venture capital (but not in buyouts) are able to identify and access superior performing funds.

We study the sources of corporate default clustering in the United States. We reject the hypothesis that firms’ default times are correlated only because their conditional default rates depend on observable and latent systematic factors. By contrast, we find strong evidence that contagion, through which the default by one firm has a direct impact on the health of other firms, is a significant clustering source. The amount of clustering that cannot be explained by contagion and firms’ exposure to observable and latent systematic factors is insignificant. Our results have important implications for the pricing and management of correlated default risk.

The more the target knows about the bidder, the more difficult is paying the target with overpriced bidder shares. Thus, when bidders are opportunistic, the fraction of stock in the deal payment will be lower for better informed targets. We test this intuitive prediction against the alternative that stock payments primarily reflect bidder concerns with target adverse selection, which implies a greater fraction of stock in the deal payment for better informed targets. Discriminating between these two mutually exclusive and nested predictions requires measures of target information about the bidder but not of market mispricing. We find that public bidders systematically use more stock in the payment when the target knows more about the bidder. Tests exploiting exogenous variation in bidder market-to-book ratios also fail to support bidder opportunism. Finally, greater potential competition from private bidders is associated with greater propensity for public bidders to pay in cash.

We apply the concept of carry, which has been studied almost exclusively in currency markets, to any asset. A security’s expected return is decomposed into its “carry,” an ex-ante and model-free characteristic, and its expected price appreciation. Carry predicts returns cross-sectionally and in time series for a host of different asset classes, including global equities, global bonds, commodities, US Treasuries, credit, and options. Carry is not explained by known predictors of returns from these asset classes, and it captures many of these predictors, providing a unifying framework for return predictability. We reject a generalized version of Uncovered Interest Parity and the Expectations Hypothesis in favor of models with varying risk premia, in which carry strategies are commonly exposed to global recession, liquidity, and volatility risks, though none fully explains carry’s premium.

Personal managerial indiscretions are separate from a firm's business activities but provide information about the manager's integrity. Consequently, they could affect counterparties’ trust in the firm and the firm's value and operations. We find that companies of accused executives experience significant wealth deterioration, reduced operating margins, and lost business partners. Indiscretions are also associated with an increased probability of unrelated shareholder-initiated lawsuits, Department of Justice and Securities and Exchange Commission investigations, and managed earnings. Further, chief executive officers and boards face labor market consequences, including forced turnover, pay cuts, and lower shareholder votes at re-election. Indiscretions occur more often at poorly governed firms where disciplinary turnover is less likely.

This paper constructs and analyzes various measures of trading costs in US equity markets covering the period 1926–2015. These measures contain statistically and economically significant predictive signals for stock market returns and real economic activity. We decompose illiquidity proxies into a component capturing aggregate volatility and a residual. The predictive content of these components differs in important ways. Specifically, we find strong evidence that the component of illiquidity uncorrelated with volatility forecasts stock market returns. Both the volatility and residual components of illiquidity contain information regarding future economic activity.