This paper develops a new methods for measuring tax effects in bond markets and presents empirical results for British Government Securities. The basic idea is to construct a least cost portfolio which, for investors in a given tax bracket, dominates a given bond. A portfolio is said to dominate a bond if it provides cash flows which are at least as great in every period, and has a lower price. In effect our method calculates an upper bound on the value of a bond to investors in a given tax bracket. The results demonstrate (i) the existence of clientele effects and (ii) the absence of an ‘effective tax rate’.

This paper estimates real term structures from cross-sections of British government index-linked (‘realrd) bond prices. The Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985) model is then fitted to the same data; the model closely approximates the shapes of the directly-estimated term structures. In contrast to similar studies of the nominal term structure, the long-term zero-coupon yield is quite stable, as the CIR model predicts, and in common with previous studies, the level of implied short rate volatility corresponds well with time series estimates. The other parameters, however, are often highly correlated and intertemporal parameter stability is rejected.

We investigate how the dynamics of corporate debt policy affect the pricing of corporate bonds. We find empirically that debt issuance has a significant stochastic component that is imperfectly correlated with shocks to asset value. As a consequence, the volatility of leverage is significantly higher than asset volatility over short horizons. At long horizons, the relation between leverage and asset volatility is reversed due to mean reversion in leverage. We incorporate these stochastic debt dynamics into structural models of credit risk, both standard diffusion models as well as newer models with stochastic volatility and jumps. Including stochastic debt gives more accurate predictions of credit spreads in both the cross-section and the time series.

We identify a new and important property of affine term structure models: at long maturities, the slope of the term structure of risk premia becomes “almost observable”. Exploiting this property by fitting models to long-maturity data dramatically improves the precision of estimates of risk premia and expected short rates across the term structure. In a Monte Carlo experiment we show that using rates with maturities up to 25 years, rather than 10 years as is standard in the literature, reduces the standard deviation of estimation errors in risk premia, expected short rates and term premia by over 70%. Applying this approach to US Treasury data, we find that variation in expected short rates accounts for a much larger share of variation in yields (and variation in term premia a correspondingly smaller fraction) than in the widely used estimates reported by the Federal Reserve. Accounting for time-variation in yield volatility is key to successful extraction of the risk premium information in long rates. Our approach therefore departs from much of the empirical literature in two important respects: it incorporates long-maturity yields and allows for time-varying yield volatility, whereas most existing studies ignore long-term yields and rely on constant volatility models.

We study corporate bond default rates using an extensive new data set spanning the 1866–2008 period. We find that the corporate bond market has repeatedly suffered clustered default events much worse than those experienced during the Great Depression. For example, during the railroad crisis of 1873–1875, total defaults amounted to 36% of the par value of the entire corporate bond market. Using a regime-switching model, we examine the extent to which default rates can be forecast by financial and macroeconomic variables. We find that stock returns, stock return volatility, and changes in GDP are strong predictors of default rates. Surprisingly, however, credit spreads are not. Over the long term, credit spreads are roughly twice as large as default losses, resulting in an average credit risk premium of about 80 basis points. We also find that credit spreads do not adjust in response to realized default rates.

Using an extensive data set on corporate bond defaults in the US from 1866 to 2010, we study the macroeconomic effects of bond market crises and contrast them with those resulting from banking crises. During the past 150 years, the US has experienced many severe corporate default crises in which 20–50% of all corporate bonds defaulted. Although the total par amount of corporate bonds has at times rivaled the amount of bank loans outstanding, we find that corporate default crises have far fewer real effects than do banking crises. These results provide empirical support for current theories that emphasize the unique role that banks and the credit and collateral channels play in amplifying macroeconomic shocks.