Using quotations from two interest rate swap dealers with different credit ratings (AAA and A), we examine the effect of dealers' credit reputations on swap quotations and bid-offer spreads. The AAA offer rates are significantly higher than the A offer rates, and the AAA bid rates are significantly lower than the A bid rates. We also document the relation between swap rates and par bond yields estimated from London interbank offered rate (LIBOR) and bid rate (LIBID) data. We identify some of the problems in testing the implications of swap pricing theory.

This paper theoretically and empirically investigates the effects of liquidity regulation on the banking system. We document that the current quantity-based liquidity rule has reduced banks' liquidity risks. However, the mandated liquidity buffer appears to crowd out bank lending and lead to a migration of liquidity risks to banks that are not subject to liquidity regulation. These findings motivate a model of liquidity regulation with endogenous liquidity premiums and heterogeneous banks. The model shows that the current liquidity rule can improve upon the unregulated equilibrium but can also have distortionary effects because of the dual role of the liquidity buffer as an implicit tax and a costly mitigator of liquidity risks. The fixed quantity mandate can interact with the uncertain liquidity demand, amplifying the volatility in the liquidity premium. A central bank committed liquidity facility could improve the current quantity-based regulation by introducing a price-based mechanism.

We use when-issued transactions data to assess the Treasury's current experiment with uniform auctions. When-issued volume is higher under uniform as compared to discriminatory auctions, suggesting a higher information release, which should reduce pre-auction uncertainty and the winner's curse. Under uniform auctions, when-issued volatility falls after the auction and again after the outcome announcement. The pattern is the opposite for discriminatory auctions. This is further evidence that uniform auctions increase pre-auction information and lower the short squeeze. A direct comparison of markups in uniform and discriminatory auctions yields mixed results.

A framework for valuing floating-rate notes is developed to examine the effects of (1) lags in the coupon formula, (2) special contractual features and (3) default risk. Evidence from a sample of floaters indicates they sold at significant discounts. While lags in the coupon formulas and other contractual features make these notes more variable, they do not account for the magnitude of the discounts. We conclude that the fixed default premium in the coupon formula of a typical note is inadequate to compensate for time-varying default premiums demanded by investors, who treat other corporate short-term paper as close substitutes.