We exploit the deregulation of interstate bank branching laws to test whether banking competition affects innovation. We find robust evidence that banking competition reduces state-level innovation by public corporations headquartered within deregulating states. Innovation increases among private firms that are dependent on external finance and that have limited access to credit from local banks. We argue that banking competition enables small, innovative firms to secure financing instead of being acquired by public corporations. Therefore, banking competition reduces the supply of innovative targets, which reduces the portion of state-level innovation attributable to public corporations. Overall, these results shed light on the real effects of banking competition and the determinants of innovation.

Identifying firms’ bond-market-specific economic links through credit-rating comovement of their corporate bonds, a long-short strategy for stocks based on these links generates a risk-adjusted alpha of 0.45% per month, which cannot be explained by existing economic links in the literature. Market segmentation between the equity and bond markets appears to be the underlying mechanism: (i) The cross-return predictability is muted in the bond market; (ii) The cross-return predictability is mitigated in the presence of cross-holding investors; (iii) Equity analysts slowly incorporate information from rating-comovement links to their forecasts.