We examine the effects of mandatory board gender quotas on unregulated firms that are connected to regulated ones via interlocking directorates. After the introduction of quotas, connected firms significantly increase their share of female directors relative to similar unconnected firms. The spillover effects are substantial — at least as large as the direct effects on regulated firms, challenging previous claims that quotas have no broader impact on women in business. Our results suggest that quotas indirectly broaden the supply of candidates for connected firms, along dimensions that include, but are not limited to, gender

To enforce insider trading laws, financial regulators require top executives to make their own-company trades public. One implication of this regulatory focus is that executives below the top fly under the radar. We use administrative register data from Norway to examine whether executives below the top in listed companies earn abnormal returns on purchases in own-company stock. We find evidence of abnormal returns on such trades, about 50 to 100 basis points at the 1-month horizon. The abnormal returns on purchases in other stocks are negative, making high investor ability an unlikely explanation

Hidden fees can distort consumer decision-making. In response, regulators historically have (a) improved disclosure to make fees more salient or (b) standardized products to restrict what fees can be charged. We use Chilean administrative data and a multi-stage natural experiment to separately identify the effects of disclosure and standardization on repayment. We find that disclosure reduces delinquencies by 13.7 percentage points (40%) and default by 1.68 percentage points (98%), whereas standardization has no effect. We find no effect on initial loan terms, suggesting that disclosure’s effects are specific to repayment behavior: specifically, disclosure improves borrowers’ understanding of their credit obligations

We use newspapers to create Equity Market Volatility (EMV) trackers at daily and monthly frequencies. Our headline EMV tracker moves closely with the VIX and the S&P500 returns volatility in and out of sample. We exploit the volume of newspaper text to construct forty category-specific EMV trackers. News about commodity markets, interest rates, real estate markets, aggregate activity, and inflation figure prominently in EMV articles. Policy news is another major source of market volatility: 30 % of EMV articles discuss tax policy, 30 % discuss monetary policy, and 25 % refer to some form of regulation. Combining our newspaper-based trackers with textual analysis of 10-K filings, we obtain monthly firm-level risk exposure measures. These measures help explain the cross-sectional structure of realized volatilities and its evolution over time, even after conditioning on firm and time fixed effects

Self-imposed risk limits effectively limit dealers' appetite for risks and their capacity to intermediate in Treasury markets in times of market stress. Using granular and high frequency regulatory data on US dealers' Treasury securities trading desk positions and desk-level Value-at-Risk limits, we show that dealers are more inclined to reduce their positions as they get closer to their internal risk limit, consistent with such limit being meaningful and costly for traders to breach. Dealers actively manage their inventories away from their limits by selling longer-term securities and requiring higher compensation to take on additional risks. During the height of the Covid-crisis in 2020, dealer desks that were closer to their VaR limits sold more Treasury securities to the Fed and accepted lower prices in the emergency open market operations. Our findings complement studies that link post-GFC bank regulations to market liquidity by showing that self-imposed risk limits can explain the risk-averse behavior by dealers, and provide a micro-foundation for the link between market volatility and market liquidity in dealer-intermediated OTC markets. In times of crisis, policy prescriptions such as deregulation alone may not be sufficient to induce risk-taking by dealer intermediaries. Moreover, to address market functioning issues, policy actions that address the funding costs of intermediaries would not be as effective as policies that remove risks from intermediary balance sheets directly