Knowledge that Transforms

I use a unique institutional feature of money market funds to identify whether funds hold additional liquidity to guard against and prevent potential investor runs. Specifically, some funds are used as a cash management vehicle for related entities, such as other funds in the fund family. These “internal” funds should experience less outflows during market stress, and should thus have less need to hold this additional liquidity. Indeed, these “internal” prime money market funds do hold lower liquidity than other prime funds. This effect is most pronounced at quarter ends, when there is an exogenous reduction in cash demand from non-US bank dealers.

We examine the effects on IPO uncertainty of an alternative going-public mechanism – the two-stage IPO, where a firm first gets quoted on the OTC market, and then upgrades to a national exchange where it first issues public equity. We find that a two-stage IPO firm experiences lower underpricing and return volatility than does a similar traditional IPO firm. Our study is the first to analyze the impact of U.S. pre-IPO disclosure and liquidity on levels of uncertainty and pricing at the IPO stage. We find that greater disclosure and liquidity during the first stage leads to greater reduction in IPO uncertainty. We control for the potentially endogenous nature of the two-stage IPOs by using a difference-in-difference analysis that utilizes two exogenous OTC market events.

This study shows the importance of return discrimination between funds in the flow-performance relationship. To do so, we employ objective-adjusted returns rather than performance ranks. We demonstrate that the net flow-performance relationship is a direct consequence of the convex inflow- and outflow-performance relationships, and that fund size and age have no significant effect on these relationships. When we measure past performance using 12-month objective-adjusted returns, we find a linear net flow-performance relationship after controlling for the investor-substitution effect.

This paper studies rehypothecation, a practice in which financial institutions re-pledge collateral pledged to them by their clients. Rehypothecation enhances provision of funding liquidity to the economy, but it also incurs deadweight cost by misallocating the asset among the agents when counterparties fail. We examine the possibility of a conflict between the intermediary and its borrower on rehypothecation arrangements. The direction of this conflict depends on haircuts of the contract between them: if the contract involves over-collateralization, there tends to be an excessive use of rehypothecation, and if the contract involves under-collateralization, there tends to be an insufficient use of rehypothecation. This offers an empirical prediction of a link between the size of haircut in collateralized financial contracts, borrower information, and the likelihood of rehypothecation.

This paper adopts a novel approach to examine the roles of gender difference and intra-household economic power in mortgage signing order. We develop an “economic power” index based on relative economic power within the same-sex couple households. We then use this measure along with gender identity and other factors to explain signing order in different-gender couples. Our results suggest that, while pure economic power explains much of the observed signing order, gender difference plays an important role. Analysis exploiting regional variation reveals that gender difference in signing order is greater in states with a larger gender wage gap and red states whose residents predominantly vote for the Republican.

The Dodd–Frank Act created differential regulatory requirements for banks above specified asset size thresholds. Event study results imply greater expected net regulatory costs for above-threshold banks. Consistent with hypotheses that near-below-threshold banks alter their behavior to attempt to avoid or delay the regulatory costs and/or to ensure growth that they do experience is highly beneficial, we find that near-below-threshold banks grow assets, risk-weighted assets, and total loans more slowly, and charge higher rates on commercial loans. The results suggest that the Dodd–Frank Act created costs that near-below-threshold banks attempt to avoid by altering their behaviors in economically important ways.

Does an increase in competition increase or decrease bank stability? I use a novel way to capture changes in banking competition by exploring how the exogenous state-specific process of banking deregulation gradually lowered entry barriers into urban banking markets. I find that the increase in market contestability significantly improves bank stability. This result is robust to the inclusion of additional fixed effects and other influences, such as mergers and acquisitions, or geographic expansion. Moreover, I find that greater competition reduces banks’ failure probability, share of non-performing loans and increases profitability. These findings suggest that competition increases stability, as it improves bank profitability and asset quality.

By exploiting state-level variations in mortgage broker licensing regulations, we examine how licensing requirements affect mortgage loan performances and the mortgage origination market. Using data on private label securitized loans, we find that loans in states with a toughened broker licensing had a smaller increase in default rates. This effect is larger in the years leading up to the financial crisis, for borrowers with lower credit scores, cash-out-refinance loans, high-minority neighborhoods, and loans originated by nonbanks. The improved performance with toughened broker licensing is only partially reflected in loan pricing. Stronger broker licensing requirements have slightly positive effects on the mortgage approval rates, and are associated with overall less risky borrowers and loan characteristics in applications and in originations.

The Credit Card Accountability and Disclosure Act (CARD Act) of 2009 restricted several risk management practices of credit card issuers. Using a quasi-experimental design with credit bureau data on consumer lending, we find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the act's restrictions on risk management practices contributed to a large decline in bank card holding by higher risk, nonprime consumers but had little effect on prime consumers. Looking at consumer finance loans, historically a source of credit for higher risk consumers, we find greater reliance on such loans by nonprime consumers in states with high consumer finance rate ceilings following the CARD Act than by nonprime consumers in states with low rate ceilings or by prime consumers. That nonprime consumers in states with high consumer finance rate ceilings relied more heavily on consumer finance loans suggests that consumer finance loans were a substitute for subprime credit cards for risky consumers when rate ceilings permit such loans to be profitable. Consumer finance loans would not be available to many higher risk, nonprime consumers in low rate states because such loans would be unprofitable, and prime consumers would not need consumer finance loans because other less expensive types of credit would generally be available to them.

We estimate the causal effect of liquidity regulation on bank balance sheets. We take advantage of the heterogeneous implementation of tighter liquidity regulation by the UK Financial Services Authority in 2010. We find that banks adjusted the composition of both assets and liabilities, increasing the share of high quality liquid assets and non-financial deposits while reducing intra-financial loans and short-term wholesale funding. We do not find evidence that the tightening of liquidity regulation caused banks to shrink their balance sheets, nor reduce the amount of lending to the non-financial sector.