Knowledge that Transforms

This paper is based on a panel discussion at the international bank conference on Frontier Risks, Financial Innovation and Prudential Regulation of Banks in Gothenburg, Sweden, June 2–4, 2024. The panelists were Deborah Lucas, Jan Pieter Krahnen, and Magnus Olsson, with Ted Lindblom moderating. This paper contains the panel presentations, along with a unifying discussion by Paolo Fulghieri and Anjan Thakor. The main themes in the paper focus on how society should balance costs and benefits in designing the prudential regulation of banks. Optimal regulation should take into account how banks and markets interact, the dangers of both under-regulation that spawns excessive risk-taking and over-regulation that depresses value-enhancing innovation in financial services, the somewhat fragmented nature of national-sovereignty-constrained European banking and financial markets regulation relative to bank regulation in the US, and how prudential regulation can be improved by more explicitly dealing with interest rate risk.

Following the global financial crisis, banks lengthened the average maturity of their assets relative to that of their liabilities, principally by increasing their investments in mortgage-related assets. Whether such maturity transformation exposes banks to interest rate risk depends, in part, on the effectiveness of bank deposits as a hedge against interest rate shocks. In this paper we provide evidence that interest pass-through rates on deposits vary significantly with interest rates, which reduces the effectiveness of deposits as a hedge when interest rates increase. The dynamic nature of the deposit betas explains, in part, why the duration of bank equity varies with interest rates and why interest rate risk models need to account for how pass-through rates vary with interest rates.

Loan modifications can ease borrowers’ financial burdens and mitigate loan losses. However, the threat of future strategic renegotiation may cause lenders to tighten ex-ante credit provision. We evaluate this trade-off in a dynamic model of loan underwriting with frictional renegotiation and calibrate it using loan-level CRE data from banks and CMBS. We find that modification frictions can rationalize a number of empirical facts regarding how CRE loan underwriting and performance differ across lenders. Key to this result, high frictions to modifying CMBS loans reduce renegotiation, increase debt capacity, and cause high-leverage-demand borrowers to select into the CMBS market. Consequently, easing CMBS modification frictions reduces welfare by restricting the menu of LTVs available in the market.

We challenge the existing relationship lending literature on how banks manage their relationships with corporate borrowers during crises. We test theories of intertemporal smoothing during the closure period of the COVID-19 crisis when borrowers are in great need of relationship benefits. We find that relationship borrowers receive worse rather than more favorable loan contract terms than others during this period. These and other results provide novel evidence on the functioning of relationship lending during a pandemic and contrast existing evidence gleaned from banking and financial crises.

A historical look at financial boom-bust cycles shows that pro-cyclicality in financial regulation is a common and recurring pattern. This paper shows that inefficient regulatory cycles can naturally arise when electoral concerns are introduced into a simple model of financial intermediation. We explore how financial innovations, public opinion and policymakers’ incentives shape financial regulation within this framework. We show that in the presence of incompetent politicians, competent politicians take regulatory risks to signal their competence. This amplifies the influence of public opinion on policy, leading to an ex ante inefficient pro-cyclicality in financial regulation.

This paper estimates the elasticity of minority credit supply to deposit shares of Minority Depository Institutions (MDIs). I use within-county tract-level variation in exposure to the Community Reinvestment Act and show that if a census tract loses MDI presence following a merger between an MDI bank and a community bank, its minority mortgage credit declines by 40%. These effects are driven by the loss of operationally efficient MDIs, and about half of the overall impact is attributable to the loss of mission alone. A 1% increase in county market shares of such tracts leads to roughly a 3% decrease in county-level minority homeownership.

Decentralised finance (DeFi) lending protocols have experienced significant growth recently, yet the motivations driving investors remain largely unexplored. We use granular, transaction-level data from Aave, a leading player in the DeFi lending market, to study these motivations. Our theoretical and empirical findings reveal that the search for yield predominantly drives liquidity provision in DeFi lending pools, whereas borrowing activity is mainly influenced by speculative and, to some extent, governance motives. Both retail and large investors seek potential high returns through market movements and price speculation, however the latter engage in DeFi borrowing relatively more than the former also to influence protocol decisions and accrue more significant governance rights.

This paper shows that anticipation can meaningfully impact inferences about the effects of covenant violations. Using textual analysis of SEC filings and earnings call transcripts, I construct a measure of covenant concerns that identifies instances where firms disclose forward-looking risks related to their debt covenants. On average, nearly 30 percent of U.S. non-financial firms report covenant concerns each year. While the real effects of covenant violations are robust for most outcomes, the estimated impact of some variables, including cash acquisitions, default risk, and credit line availability, can be overstated. This finding highlights the importance of selection around violation: firms that anticipate and successfully avoid violations differ systematically from firms that fail to avoid them.