Knowledge that Transforms

We develop a model of corporate myopia in which the interaction between asymmetric information and short-term trading by equity holders induces firms to undertake short-term rather than long-term projects, which are intrinsically more valuable. We study the effectiveness of alternative policy prescriptions in eliminating myopia. We show that a capital gains tax cut for long-term equity holders induces optimal project selection; an across-the-board tax cut has no such impact. We characterize the long-term capital gains tax rate which eliminates corporate myopia. Further, we show that a long-term capital gains tax cut does not induce a bias toward inefficient long-term projects when it is, in fact, short-term projects which are more valuable. In contrast, an investment tax credit directed at long-term projects leads to such a bias. Finally, we show that reducing the long-term capital gains tax rate to the level required to eliminate myopic investment behavior may also lead to an increase in government tax revenues.Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: H21, G31, D82.

We analyze price competition between dealers in a security market where the bidding process is sequential. The model provides an interpretation for the evolution of the best ask and bid prices, in between transactions. We find that convergence to the competitive ask and bid prices can take time. The speed of convergence is determined by the frequency with which dealers check their offers and by the tick size. This creates a relationship between the expected trading cost and the timing of offers posted by the dealers. We also find that a zero minimum price variation never minimizes the expected trading cost. Finally, we study the role of time priority. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D43, G10.

This paper provides empirical evidence that takeovers can facilitate the efficient redeployment of assets of bankrupt firms. Bidders for bankrupt firms are generally in related industries and often have some prior relationship to the target, suggesting they are well informed with respect to both the value and best use of the target's assets. For a sample of 55 acquisitions in Chapter 11, we find that firms merged with bankrupt targets show significant improvements in operating performance, while matching non-bankrupt transactions show no significant improvement. We also find positive and significant abnormal stock returns for the bidder and bankrupt target at the announcement of the acquisition.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: G33, G34.

Merrill Lynch's decision to redirect order flow in exchange-listed equity securities from regional exchanges to the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) provides an opportunity to examine (1) whether order flow affects market makers' spread-setting behavior and (2) whether brokers can capture liquidity-cost differences between market centers for their customers. Merrill's market-order customers appear to obtain better prices on the NYSE than on the regionals. Consistently with market microstructure theory, the NYSE's quoted spread for stocks affected by Merrill's decision falls relative to a control sample and decreases absolutely for a subsample of stocks we believe most sensitive to order-flow distribution.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D40, G10.

Financial theory suggests that leverage causes firms to underinvest and that the extent of underinvestment is related to the degree of financial leverage. This prediction is consistent with both time series and cross-sectional patterns in bank lending. Bank capital typically declines in recessions due to loan losses, and this effectively increases financial leverage. As a result, system-wide underinvestment by banks is a contributing factor in “credit crunches.” In the cross section, banks with relatively poor loan quality, capital, and/or liquidity and weak banks with more opportunities subject to underinvestment should and do experience lower loan growth. Cross-sectional differences in the use of subordinated debt and in the extent of securitization provide additional evidence in support of the underinvestment hypothesis.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: E51, G21.