We examine the change in the value of the underlying stock associated with long-term option introduction. Analysis of the abnormal returns associated with LEAPS (Long-Term Equity Anticipation Security) introductions indicates a decline in firm value even after we control for the endogenous nature of the listing decision. However, the evidence does not support previously-offered explanations for the price change associated with option introductions. In particular, we do not find the predicted relations between the cumulative abnormal returns and variables associated with loosening of short sale constraints such as beta, proxies for the dispersion in investor beliefs, and change in relative short interest.

This paper tries to explain why the issuers of an asset would restrict what information is available about their asset. In a world where knowledge is valued, market forces should induce disclosure, but we often see markets (such as the market for mortgage-backed securities) where assets' issuers refuse to release valuable information. We present a model of market liquidity and find that market liquidity can both rise and fall with the quantity of released information. More information may increase asymmetries of information and “lemons” style breakdowns. We find that asset bundling is more advantageous when private information is more accurate, which may be the case in the mortgage-backed securities market.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: G14, G32.

This paper examines the change in trading costs for firms that choose to move from a dealer market to a specialist system. Using transactions data, our empirical results reveal structurally induced average trading cost reductions of 4.7 (5.2) cents per share for firms that moved from the NASDAQ/NMS to the NYSE (AMEX) in 1990. For NYSE listed stocks, the trading cost reductions are equally divided between quote improvements and the routing of trades to the NYSE. Trading cost improvements vary inversely with trade sizes and positively with dollar spreads. Finally, the greatest liquidity benefits from listing accrue to the less liquid stocks. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D40, G12, G20.

Violations of the absolute priority rule (APR) are commonplace in private workouts, formal business reorganizations, and personal bankruptcies. While some theorists suggest they may arise endogenously, they are clearly magnified by the institutional structure of the bankruptcy code. This paper shows that APR violations exacerbate credit rationing problems by reducing the payment lenders receive in default states. Furthermore, APR violations make default more likely to occur, thereby making debt financing more costly. Together, these results support the view that APR violations create an impediment to efficient financial contracting.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: G33, G38, K20.

A model with private information that supports conventional arguments for a government monopoly in supplying circulating media of exchange is constructed. The model also yields rate-of-return and velocity predictions which are consistent with observations from free banking regimes and fiat money regimes. In a laissezfaire banking equilibrium, fiat money is (essentially) not valued, and the resulting allocation is not Pareto optimal. However, if private agents are restricted from issuing circulating notes, there exists an equilibrium with valued fiat money that Pareto dominates the laissez-faire equilibrium and is Pareto optimal within a restricted class of allocations. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: 020, 310.

This paper examines the impact of reducing the tick size on market-making behavior on The Toronto Stock Exchange. The results indicate a significant decrease in the percentage of trades of fewer than 10,000 shares involving the upstairs traders and a significant increase in the percentage of trades of fewer than 1,000 share involving the designated market makers. Consistent with this finding, the upstairs traders earn significantly lower returns on non-block trades and the designated market markers earn lower returns on trades smaller than 1,000 shares. We conclude the tick size reduction benefits the trading public.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers, G20, G24.

We measure the effect of bank failures on economic growth using data from 1900 to 1930, a period without active government stabilization policies and several severe banking crises. VAR model estimates suggest bank failures have long-lasting negative effects on economic growth. A bank failure shock involving one percent of system liabilities leads to a 6.5% reduction in GNP growth within three quarters and a measurable reduction for 10 quarters. Panel VAR model estimates for the 48 states show bank failures aggravate commercial non-bank failures. Institutional and regulatory features affect the intensity of the bank failure effect. We find that bank failures have a larger impact in states with deposit insurance, in states more heavily concentrated in agriculture, and in states with fewer large firms. However, because a number of states exhibit all three characteristics, we are not able to clearly identify the true marginal effects of these factors independently.

We assess dealer behavior in the specials market for US Treasury securities by comparing dealer participation in the Federal Reserve's securities loan auctions with prices in the private market. Dealer behavior is generally consistent with the law of one price and apparent violations can largely be explained by institutional differences between the private market and the Fed's program. However, for auctions that are effectively noncompetitive, dealers regularly pass up true arbitrage opportunities and frequently overpay to borrow securities. Dealers apparently do not realize that certain auctions are noncompetitive, even though the information needed to discern this fact is publicly available in advance.

We consider risk-neutral firms that must obtain external finance. They have access to two kinds of stochastic investment opportunities. For one, return realizations are costlessly observed by all agents. For the other, return realizations are costlessly observed only by the investing firm. We examine the optimal allocation of investment between the two projects and the optimal contract used to finance it. The optimal contractual outcome can be supported by appropriate (and determinate) quantities of debt and equity issues. Investments in projects with CSV problems are associated loosely with debt. Investments in projects with observable returns are associated with equity. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G21, E51.

Despite its pervasive presence in world financial markets, there are few studies of interdealer broker markets. This paper examines the trading behavior of primary dealers in the 5-year Treasury note interdealer broker market. The analysis examines trading patterns, announcement effects, and volatility–volume relations. The results show that trading frequency is consistent with activity motivated by public information or dealer's private knowledge of inventory or order flow information. Additionally, although the interdealer broker market is an anonymous electronic compilation and matching system without designated market makers, trade size does not appear to have any information content. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C22, G14.