We study information substitutability in the financial market through a quasi-natural experiment: the pandemictriggered lockdown that has hampered people's physical interactions hence the ability to collect, process, and transmit interaction-based information. Exploiting the cross-sectional and time-series variations of lockdown and its implications on proximate investment, we investigate how the difficulty of collecting information through physical interactions has prompted a switch to electronic interactions including synchronous interactions such as virtual meetings and asynchronous ones like collecting information from the internet. We show that local-investing funds (LIFs) that mostly relied on physical interactions to access information before the pandemic had even worse performance than other funds, though the difference in performance was insignificant before the lockdown. Moreover, LIFs rebalance portfolios toward faraway stocks due to portfolio diversification and risk reduction. These findings indicate that physical-interaction-based and electronic-based information is not fully substitutable. We also show that the advantages of human-interaction-based information originate mainly from physical contacts, primarily in cafés, restaurants, bars, and fitness centers; and the virtual world based on Zoom/Skype/Team can provide a buffer but cannot substitute personal meetings in generating sufficient information.

We study how lenders in blockheld firms exploit the information on the other holdings of equity blockholders to learn their attitude toward creditors. In the presence of the conflict of interest between lenders and equityholders, information on how blockholders behave in the other firms they control provides the lenders with key information about potential blockholder behavior. We test this hypothesis using data on US public firms over the 2001–2008 period. We show that the financial conditions of these co-owned firms affect how lenders value other firms in which the owner has a major stake. Bad news on credit quality in co-owned firms raise the firm's credit risk. Our identification is based on the instrumental variables estimation where we instrument the changes in credit risk of co-owned firms by the natural disaster events in the counties of co-owned firm headquarters.