Knowledge that Transforms

Why did the failure of Lehman Brothers make the financial crisis dramatically worse? Our answer is that the financial crisis was a process of a build-up of risk during the crisis prior to the Lehman failure. During the crisis market participants tried to preserve an option to withdraw by shortening maturities — the “flight from maturity”. We show that the flight from maturity was manifested in a steepening of the term structures of spreads in money markets. With increasingly short maturities, lenders created the possibility of fast exit. The failure of Lehman Brothers was the tipping point of this build-up of systemic fragility. A crisis is a dynamic process in which “tail risk” is endogenous.

Whether an inversion is associated with weaker firm governance is an open empirical question. While many inversions happen to countries that offer weaker protection to minority shareholders than the U.S., most firms that invert continue to be treated by the SEC as an “U.S. issuer”, and thus, their shareholders benefit from the full protection offered by the U.S. Federal Securities Laws. Our analysis shows that firms that invert exhibit an increase in their stock illiquidity, information asymmetries, and a decrease in their institutional shareholdings, indicating a weaker market-based governance following the inversion. Executives also receive a smaller proportion of equity-based compensation and their wealth is less sensitive to stock prices following the inversion. Thus, despite enjoying the full protection of federal securities laws, investors perceive inverted firms to have weaker governance relative to comparable U.S. firms.

Regulators are concerned that large volumes of trading outside lit venues (i.e., dark trading) harms the functioning of financial markets. In contrast, regulators are neutral about hidden-order trading as these occur on lit venues and are associated with positive effects on market quality. An unanswered economic question concerns the interrelation between these two types of opaque trading, i.e., hidden orders and dark trading. Employing two different empirical methodologies we find that dark and hidden-order trading are substitutes. We also show that both types of opaque trading increase when markets are volatile and fewer algorithmic trading occurs. Smart order routing increases dark trading but reduces hidden-order activity.

When banks are hit by a severe liquidity shock, central banks have a key role as lenders of last resort. Despite the well-established importance of this mechanism, it is challenging to analyze it empirically. We explore a unique setting in which banks suddenly lost access to market funding due to contagion fears at the onset of the euro area sovereign debt crisis. Using monthly data at the loan, bank, and firm level, we test the role of the central bank in a scenario of imminent collapse. We find that the liquidity obtained from the central bank played a key role in temporarily supporting the supply of credit to the real economy. However, the subdued loan demand, together with moral suasion and carry trade incentives, led to an increase in banks’ sovereign bond holdings using central bank funding.

We present a screening model of the risk sensitivity of bank capital regulation. A banker funds a project with uninsured deposits and costly capital. Capital resolves a moral hazard problem in the choice of the probability of default (PD). The project’s loss given default (LGD) is the banker’s private information. The regulator receives a noisy signal about the LGD and imposes a minimum capital requirement. We show that the optimal sensitivity of capital regulation is non-monotonic in the accuracy of risk assessment. If the signal is inaccurate, the regulator should use risk-insensitive capital requirements. Given sufficient accuracy, the regulator should separate types via risk-sensitive capital requirements, reducing the risk-sensitivity of bank capital as accuracy improves.

We provide a microfounded framework for the welfare analysis of macroprudential policy within a model of rational bubbles. For this, we posit an overlapping generation model where productivity and credit supply are subject to random shocks. We find that when real interest rates are lower than the rate of growth, credit financed bubbles may be welfare improving because of their role as a buffer in channeling excessive credit supply and inefficient investment at the firms’ level, but their sudden price decrease may cause a systemic crisis. Therefore, a well designed macroprudential policy plays a key role in improving efficiency while preserving financial stability. Our theoretical framework allows us to compare the efficiency of alternative macroprudential policies. Contrarily to conventional wisdom, we show that macroprudential policy (i) may be efficient even in the absence of systemic risk, (ii) has to be contingent on productivity shocks and (iii) must be contingent upon the level of real interest rates.

Exploiting unique, time-varying, bilateral data on bank ownership for many countries, we show that exports tend to be larger when a foreign bank from the importing country is present. Entry of a foreign bank also boosts export growth to the home country of the foreign bank relative to other countries, especially when foreign bank presence in the country is large and bilateral cross-border lending low. We find supportive evidence that foreign banks facilitate trade by reducing financial frictions for firms. Entry spurs exports to the foreign bank's home country especially in sectors more dependent on external finance, and particularly so in countries less economically and financially developed and with a higher share of foreign banks. Imports of external finance dependent sectors also grow more after entry, but less so than exports do. Exit of a foreign bank does not fully eliminate the beneficial effects of prior foreign bank presence on exports.

The European Central Bank's large-scale asset purchase program targeted safe assets, but also aimed to impact prices of risky assets. The mechanism for this is the “portfolio rebalancing channel”, where financial institutions’ portfolio decisions impact financial prices more broadly. We examine this mechanism using cross-sectional heterogeneity in how the financial portfolios of different sectors of the European economy were affected around the purchase program. We find evidence of rebalancing. In vulnerable countries, where macroeconomic unbalances and relatively high risk premia remained, we document rebalancing towards riskier securities. In less vulnerable countries, based on granular information for large European banks, we document rebalancing toward bank loans.

We develop a conceptual framework that links the compensation incentives of bank executives to the risk and return externalities generated by banks but borne by society. Using 1994 to 2016 data from large U.S. commercial banks, we find that CEO pay-performance incentives reduce both negative systemic risk externalities and positive liquidity creation externalities, while pay-risk incentives increase both externalities. Our findings offer support for Federal Reserve guidelines that encourage greater reliance on long-term equity-based compensation, and they infer a regulatory tradeoff: Bank executive pay rules aimed at reducing systemic risk will result in reduced system-wide liquidity creation as well.

Private investments in public equities (PIPEs) are an important source of finance for public corporations. PIPE investor returns decline with holding periods, while time to exit depends on the issue's registration status and underlying liquidity. We estimate PIPE investor returns adjusting for these factors. Our analysis, which is the first to estimate returns to investors rather than issuers, indicates that the average PIPE investor holds the stock for 384 days and earns an abnormal return of 19.7%. More constrained firms tend to issue PIPEs to hedge funds and private equity funds in offerings that have higher expected returns and higher volatility. PIPE investors’ abnormal returns appear to reflect compensation for providing capital to financially constrained firms.