Knowledge that Transforms

Interest rates in many advanced economies have been low for almost a decade now and are often expected to remain so. This creates challenges for banks. Using a sample of 3385 banks from 47 countries from 2005 to 2013, we find a one percentage point interest rate drop implies an 8 basis points lower net interest margin, with this effect greater (20 basis points) at low rates. Low rates also adversely affect bank profitability, but with more variation. And for each additional year of “low-for-long”, margins and profitability fall by another 9 and 6 basis points, respectively.

Before the 1930s Building and Loan Associations (B&Ls) were the leading residential mortgage leaders in the U.S. When severely distressed during the housing crisis of the 1930s, B&Ls frequently took years to liquidate. These delays in resolution resulted from the unique B&L contract that encouraged borrowing members to prolong dissolution and gave them shared control over the timing of liquidation. We estimate a hazard model of dissolution using a new dataset of New Jersey B&Ls and find that the probability of liquidation rose 37% when the share of non-borrowing members rose above two-thirds. The severe restriction on liquidity suffered by non-borrowers was instrumental to the rapid transition from the traditional B&L to the modern Savings & Loan industry during the 1930s housing crisis.

This paper considers optimal executive pay regulations for banks that are too-big-to-fail. Theoretically, we map the consequences of a series of commonly-used pay schemes, describing their relative optimality and ultimate societal consequences. We argue that in a world of too-big-to-fail policy, simple equity-linked remuneration schemes maximise shareholder value by incentivising executives to choose excessively risky projects at the expense of the taxpayer. We find that paying the executive partly in debt fails to mitigate the project choice distortion when debt markets are informed. By contrast, both clawback rules and linking pay to interest rates can incentivise the executive to make socially optimal risk choices, but only if they are accompanied by appropriate restrictions on the curvature of pay with respect to the bank’s market value. Pay curvature can be generated by tools such as equity options and promotion policy. The policy implication is that unless regulators can enforce restrictions on pay curvature, bank shareholders can undermine the effectiveness of these pay regulations.

We investigate how seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) by issuers with large customers affect both trading partners’ market values and the relationship's health. We hypothesize that SEOs reveal adverse information about an issuer's major customers and find that issuers and their large customers experience negative returns on SEO announcements. These results are more pronounced when customers have higher levels of information asymmetry and when customer-supplier relationships are particularly important. Large customers of issuers experience larger declines in post-SEO sales, operating performance, and credit ratings than large customers of non-issuers. Also, SEO issuer sales to large customers and relationship duration significantly decline.

Bank liquidity shortages associated with the growth of wholesale-funded credit intermediation has motivated the implementation of liquidity regulations. We analyze a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in which liquidity and capital regulations interact with the supply of risk-free assets. In the model, the endogenously time varying tightness of liquidity and capital constraints generates intermediaries’ leverage cycle, influencing the pricing of risk and the level of risk in the economy. Our analysis focuses on liquidity policies’ implications for households’ welfare. Within the context of our model, liquidity requirements are preferable to capital requirements, as tightening liquidity requirements lowers the likelihood of systemic distress without impairing consumption growth. In addition, we find that intermediate ranges of risk-free asset supply achieve higher welfare.

One aim of post-crisis monetary policy has been to ease credit conditions for borrowers by unlocking bank lending. We find that bank equity is an important determinant of both the bank's funding cost and its lending growth. In a cross-country bank-level study, we find that a 1 percentage point increase in the equity-to-total assets ratio is associated with a four basis point reduction in the cost of debt financing and with a 0.6 percentage point increase in annual loan growth. These findings suggest that greater retention of bank earnings and hence higher bank capital would have aided the transmission of accommodative monetary policy to ease financial conditions faced by ultimate borrowers. In particular, we find that the effects of a monetary tightening are smaller for banks with higher capitalization, which have easier access to uninsured financing. These results suggest that if the banking system as a whole is weakly capitalized, there may be some tension between the monetary policy imperative of unlocking bank lending (i.e., expanding credit) and the supervisory objective of ensuring the soundness of individual banks (i.e., shrinking credit).

We present a novel way to examine macro-financial linkages by focusing on the real effects of bank supervisors’ enforcement actions. Exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in supervisory monitoring intensity, we show that enforcement actions in single-market banks trigger temporarily large adverse effects for the macroeconomy by reducing personal income growth, the number of establishments, and increasing unemployment. These effects are related to contractions in bank lending and liquidity creation, and are more pronounced when we consider enforcement actions on both single-market and multi-market banks, and in counties with fewer banks and greater external financial dependence.

We present the first empirical study of loan searching strategies and loan granting decisions in a context where banks observe whether applicants have unsuccessfully applied for credit to other lenders in the past. Our identification strategy benefits from the use of granular data on loan applications and exploits the fact that evaluating lenders observe only the rejections received by a borrower up to six months before the current application. We document that past rejections diminish the probability of approval and increase the probability that a loan search is interrupted.

This paper analyzes in an international sample of banks from 104 countries if the sensitivity of the cost of deposits to bank risk varies across banks depending on their systemic and absolute size. We analyze a period before the 2007 financial crisis and control for endogeneity of bank size, intervention policies in past banking crises, and soundness of countries’ public finances. Our results are consistent with the predominance of the too-big-to-fail hypothesis, although this effect is stronger in countries that did not impose losses on depositors in past banking crises and in countries with sounder public finances.

We document strong weekly lead-lag return predictability across stocks from different industries with no customer-supplier linkages (economically unrelated stocks). Between 1980 and 2010, the industry-neutral long-short hedge portfolio earns an average of over 19 basis points per week. This predictability is related to common institutional ownership and is distinct from previously documented lead-lag effects. Common institutional ownership is a complementary rather than a substitute explanation for return predictability. Information linkages are enough to induce return predictability among stocks in the same industry, but economically unrelated stocks exhibit return predictability only when they have common institutional owners. Our findings suggest that institutional portfolio reallocations can induce return predictability among otherwise unrelated stocks.