Knowledge that Transforms

We study the effects of regulatory interventions and capital support (bailouts) on banks’ liquidity creation. We rely on instrumental variables to deal with possible endogeneity concerns. Our key findings, which are based on a unique supervisory German dataset, are that regulatory interventions robustly trigger decreases in liquidity creation, while capital support does not affect liquidity creation. Additional results include the effects of these actions on different components of liquidity creation, lending, and risk taking. Our findings provide new and important insights into the debates about the design of regulatory interventions and bailouts.

Based on comprehensive regulatory data on equity mutual fund option use from the SEC's N-SAR filings, we are the first to present consistent evidence that equity funds' option use generates higher risk-adjusted performance. We further show that this is a direct effect of option use and not an indirect effect of other fund characteristics. Option use also directly results in lower systematic risk, as funds show significantly lower market betas during periods of options usage. Finally, mutual funds use options mainly for hedging as they primarily use protective puts and covered calls. These results are independent of known phenomena, such as the low beta anomaly, and robust to tests for endogeneity and a novel 5-factor model including an investable option strategy factor (IOS). Overall, our findings show that mutual fund option use is beneficial to investors and does not pose risk to the financial system as feared by the SEC. Our results are thus important for investors as well as regulators.

In September 2008, the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, were placed into conservatorship. The GSEs' equity prices dropped considerably in response, and, as a result, many banks that held sizable amounts of the preferred stock of the two GSEs recognized substantial losses. Fifteen failures and two mergers resulted. We treat these losses as plausibly exogenous, unanticipated, supply-side shocks to bank lending, as they are likely unrelated to demand-side factors that could affect lending, and because GSE investments were considered to be safe by banks, regulators, and rating agencies. As a result, this event allows us to examine the relationship between community bank condition and lending during the global financial crisis. We find that, following the shock, loan growth at exposed banks was about 2 percentage points lower than other banks.

Financial inclusion—defined as the use of formal accounts—can bring many benefits to individuals. Yet, we know very little about the factors underpinning it. This paper explores the individual and country characteristics associated with financial inclusion and the policies that are effective among those most likely to be excluded: poor, rural, female or young individuals. Overall, we find that greater financial inclusion is associated with lower account costs, greater proximity to financial intermediaries, stronger legal rights, and more politically stable environments. However, the effectiveness of policies to promote inclusion varies depending on the characteristics of the individuals considered.

This paper offers a historical perspective on the evolution of central banks as lenders of last resort (LOLR). Countries differ in the statutory powers of the LOLR, which is the outcome of a political bargain. Collateralized LOLR lending as envisioned by Bagehot (1873) requires five key legal and institutional preconditions, all of which required political agreement. LOLR mechanisms evolved to include more than collateralized lending. LOLRs established prior to World War II, with few exceptions, followed policies that can be broadly characterized as implementing “Bagehot's Principles”: seeking to preserve systemic financial stability rather than preventing the failure of particular banks, and limiting the amount of risk absorbed by the LOLR as much as possible when providing financial assistance. After World War II, and especially after the 1970s, generous deposit insurance and ad hoc bank bailouts became the norm. The focus of bank safety net policy changed from targeting systemic stability to preventing depositor loss and the failure of banks. Statutory powers of central banks do not change much over time, or correlate with country characteristics, instead reflecting idiosyncratic political histories.

We examine the dynamic behavior of bank capital using a global sample of 64 countries during the 1994–2010 period. Banks achieve deleveraging primarily through equity growth (rather than asset liquidation). In contrast, they achieve leveraging through reduced earnings retention and substantial asset expansion. The speed of capital structure adjustment is heterogeneous across countries. Banks make faster capital structure adjustments in countries with more stringent capital requirements, better supervisory monitoring, more developed capital markets, and high inflation. In times of crises, banks adjust their capital structure significantly more quickly.

We study the behavior of private pension funds as large depositors in a banking system. Using panel data analysis, we examine whether, and if so how, pension funds influence market discipline in Argentina in the period 1998–2001. We find that the disciplining role of pension funds depends on whether or not banks are connected to the pension fund industry through ownership of pension fund management companies. We find evidence that pension funds exert market discipline on unconnected banks but not on connected ones. On balance, pension funds undermine market discipline in the banking system as a result of conflicts of interest. We conclude that regulations aimed at averting these conflicts can enhance market discipline.

We use detailed data on over 350 banks in emerging Europe to analyze how bank ownership and the Vienna Initiative impacted credit growth during the Great Recession. As part of the Vienna Initiative, western European banks signed country-specific commitment letters in which they pledged to maintain exposures and to support their subsidiaries in emerging Europe. We show that while both domestic and foreign banks sharply curtailed credit during the financial crisis, foreign banks that participated in the Vienna Initiative were relatively stable lenders. We find no evidence of negative spillovers from countries where banks signed commitment letters to countries where they did not.

Using the entire universe of Bankscope and Amadeus Top 250,000 we construct the portfolios of shareholders who hold equity stakes in publicly traded and privately held European banks for each year over the period 1999–2008. We show that about 62% of banks’ ultimate largest shareholders are diversified investors, holding on average equity investments from thirteen companies in their portfolio. We exploit this heterogeneity to investigate the impact of their portfolio diversification on bank risk-taking. Our results show that banks with more diversified shareholders undertake more risks. This relation is both statistically significant and economically sizeable. Overall, these findings contribute to the literature by studying for the first time a specific channel through which financial development, in the form of bank shareholders’ diversification, affects the banks’ risk-taking decisions.

The use of collateral has become one of the most widespread risk mitigation techniques. While it brings stabilizing effects to the individual cash lender, it may exacerbate systemic risk by accelerating bank deleveraging under funding stress. We show how a liquidity shock to the cash lender may propagate as a solvency shock via liquidity hoarding even if the cash lender remains solvent in all states of nature. Albeit a privately optimal response of the cash lender to a liquidity shock, bank deleveraging may lead to excessive bankruptcy among its borrowing counterparties while, at the same time, triggering contagion across asset classes. To buttress financial system resilience, we lay out a menu of macroprudential policies that deactivate this channel of financial contagion.