Knowledge that Transforms

The 2007–9 financial crisis began with increased uncertainty over funding conditions in money markets. We show that funding uncertainty can explain diverse elements of commercial banks’ behavior during the crisis, including: (i) reductions in lending volumes, balance sheets, and profitability; (ii) more intense competition for retail deposits (including deposits turning into a “loss leader”); (iii) stronger lending cuts by more highly extended banks with a smaller deposit base; (iv) weaker pass-through from changes in the central bank’s policy rate to market interest rates; and (v) a binding “zero lower bound” as well as a rationale for unconventional monetary policy.

Is financial innovation necessary for sustaining economic growth? To address this question, we build a Schumpeterian model in which entrepreneurs earn profits by inventing better goods and profit-maximizing financiers arise to screen entrepreneurs. The model has two novel features. First, financiers engage in the costly but potentially profitable process of innovation: they can invent better methods for screening entrepreneurs. Second, every screening process becomes less effective as technology advances. The model predicts that technological innovation and economic growth eventually stop unless financiers innovate. Empirical evidence is consistent with this dynamic, synergistic model of financial and technological innovation.

This paper shows that the effects of financial liberalization on the credit market of a small and capital constrained economy depend on the market structure of domestic banks prior to liberalization. Specifically, under perfect competition in the domestic credit market prior to liberalization, liberalization leads to lower domestic interest rates, in turn leading to increased credit penetration. However, when the initial market structure is one of imperfect competition, liberalization can lead to the exclusion of less wealthy entrepreneurs from the credit market. This provides a rationale for the mixed empirical evidence concerning the effects of liberalization on access to credit in developing markets. Moreover, the analysis provides new insights into the consequences of foreign lenders’ entry into developing economies.

We propose a method for measuring the systemic importance of interconnected banks. In order to capture contributions to system-wide risk, our measure accounts fully for the extent to which a bank (i) propagates shocks across the system and (ii) is vulnerable to propagated shocks. An empirical implementation of this measure and a popular alternative reveals that interconnectedness is a key driver of systemic importance. However, since the two measures reflect the impact of interbank borrowing and lending on system-wide risk differently, they can disagree substantially about the systemic importance of individual banks.

We analyze the relationship between contracts and returns in private equity (PE) investments. Contractual control in the form of covenants tends to be employed to identify good deals. Better quality firms are more likely to have covenant-rich contracts, as they are less concerned by the constraints imposed by the covenants. PE investors appoint closer associates of the fund in deals that are performing poorly but tend to outsource board governance in better deals. Collectively, our evidence suggests that PE investors operate along two dimensions, choosing covenants and board seats differently, based on the ex ante quality of the company.

Doubts about the accuracy with which outside investors can assess a banking firm’s value motivate many government interventions in the banking market. Although the available empirical evidence is somewhat mixed, the recent financial crisis has reinforced a common assessment that banks are unusually opaque. This paper examines bank equity’s trading characteristics during “normal” periods and two “crisis” periods between 1993 and 2009. We find only limited (mixed) evidence that banks are unusually opaque during normal periods. However, consistent with theory, crises raise the adverse selection costs of trading bank shares relative to those of nonbank control firms. A bank’s balance sheet composition significantly affects its equity opacity, but we cannot detect specific balance sheet categories that have robust effects.

This paper examines the impact of bank capital ratios on bank lending by comparing differences in loan growth to differences in capital ratios at sets of banks that are matched based on geographic area as well as size and various business characteristics. We argue that such comparisons are most effective at controlling for local loan demand and other environmental factors. For comparison we also control for local factors using MSA fixed effects. We find, based on data from 2001 to 2011, that the relationship between capital ratios and bank lending was significant during and shortly following the recent financial crisis but not at other times. We find that the relationship between capital ratios and loan growth is stronger for banks where loans are contracting than where loans are expanding. We also show that the elasticity of bank lending with respect to capital ratios is higher when capital ratios are relatively low, suggesting that the effect of capital ratio on bank lending is nonlinear. In addition, we present findings on the relationship between bank capital and lending by bank size and loan type.

This paper documents large cross-country variation in the relationship between bank competition and bank stability and explores market, regulatory and institutional features that can explain this variation. We show that an increase in competition will have a larger impact on banks’ fragility in countries with stricter activity restrictions, lower systemic fragility, better developed stock exchanges, more generous deposit insurance and more effective systems of credit information sharing. The effects are economically large and thus have important repercussions for the current regulatory reform debate.

The paper examines a continuous-time delegated monitoring problem between competitive investors and an impatient bank monitoring a pool of long-term loans subject to Markovian “contagion.” Moral hazard induces a foreclosure bias unless the bank is compensated with the right incentive-compatible contract. Fees are paid when the bank’s performance is on target and liquidation arises when the bank’s performance is sufficiently poor. I show that the optimal contract can be implemented with a whole loan sale involving both credit risk retention based on ABS credit default swaps and credit enhancement in the form of a reserve account. The optimal securitization bears out rulemaking recently proposed in the wake of the Dodd-Frank Act on a number of controversial provisions. I argue that further efficiency gains could be reaped by extending the role of the “premium capture” account into a liquidity buffer capturing performance-based compensation as a way of increasing skin in the game over the life of the transaction.

We consider the role of the nonrecourse financing of securitization by a financial institution (FI). Our model suggests that even though the FI has the opportunity to provide liquidity support afterward, it is optimal for the FI to use the nonrecourse financing of securitization initially, because the nonrecourse security makes liquidation of the original asset more attractive for an FI that knows that the original asset is bad. However, our model also predicts that the nonrecourse financing of securitization, together with short-term maturity financing, forces the financial system to perform inefficiently in handling troubled loans and causes problems with inefficient liquidity support and overinvestment under certain conditions, despite the nonrecourse property of securitization. The theoretical results provide empirical implications for recent problems with securitized and structured finance in the United States and Europe.