Knowledge that Transforms

This paper provides empirical evidence that takeovers can facilitate the efficient redeployment of assets of bankrupt firms. Bidders for bankrupt firms are generally in related industries and often have some prior relationship to the target, suggesting they are well informed with respect to both the value and best use of the target's assets. For a sample of 55 acquisitions in Chapter 11, we find that firms merged with bankrupt targets show significant improvements in operating performance, while matching non-bankrupt transactions show no significant improvement. We also find positive and significant abnormal stock returns for the bidder and bankrupt target at the announcement of the acquisition.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: G33, G34.

Merrill Lynch's decision to redirect order flow in exchange-listed equity securities from regional exchanges to the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) provides an opportunity to examine (1) whether order flow affects market makers' spread-setting behavior and (2) whether brokers can capture liquidity-cost differences between market centers for their customers. Merrill's market-order customers appear to obtain better prices on the NYSE than on the regionals. Consistently with market microstructure theory, the NYSE's quoted spread for stocks affected by Merrill's decision falls relative to a control sample and decreases absolutely for a subsample of stocks we believe most sensitive to order-flow distribution.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D40, G10.

Financial theory suggests that leverage causes firms to underinvest and that the extent of underinvestment is related to the degree of financial leverage. This prediction is consistent with both time series and cross-sectional patterns in bank lending. Bank capital typically declines in recessions due to loan losses, and this effectively increases financial leverage. As a result, system-wide underinvestment by banks is a contributing factor in “credit crunches.” In the cross section, banks with relatively poor loan quality, capital, and/or liquidity and weak banks with more opportunities subject to underinvestment should and do experience lower loan growth. Cross-sectional differences in the use of subordinated debt and in the extent of securitization provide additional evidence in support of the underinvestment hypothesis.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: E51, G21.

We study the effects of changes in bid–ask spreads on the prices and trading volumes of stocks that move from Nasdaq to the NYSE or Amex and stocks that move from Amex to Nasdaq. When stocks move from Nasdaq to an exchange, their spreads typically decrease, but the reduction in spreads is larger when Nasdaq market makers avoid odd-eighth quotes. When stocks move from Amex to Nasdaq, their spreads typically increase, but again, the increase is larger when Nasdaq market makers avoid odd eighths. We use this data to isolate the effects of transaction costs on trading volume and expected returns. We find that higher transaction costs significantly reduce trading volume, but do not have a significant effect on prices.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: G10, G14.

Theoretical studies have noted that loan applicants rejected by one bank can apply at another bank, systematically worsening the pool of applicants faced by all banks. This study presents the first empirical evidence of this effect and explores some additional ramifications, including the role of common filters—such as commercially available credit scoring models—in mitigating this adverse selection; implications forde novobanks; implications for banks' incentives to comply with fair lending laws; and macroeconomic effects. The evidence supports the simple theory regarding loan loss rates but indicates a positive association between bank structure and income growth.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: G21, D80, L10.