Knowledge that Transforms

This paper theoretically studies the effects of Knightian Uncertainty in interbank markets when the source of the Knightian Uncertainty is incomplete information on banks’ risk exposures. The main findings in the paper are: (1) When interbank loans are arranged in anonymous brokered, instead of bilateral markets, it attenuates the effects of Knightian Uncertainty on their interbank spreads and (2) Knightian uncertainty severely constrains small banks’ ability to borrow in anonymous brokered interbank markets. The findings help explain why there was an increase in the relative use of interbank brokered markets in Euro-currency countries that occurred between the second quarter of 2007 and the second quarter of 2008. The findings are also consistent with constraints on small banks’ ability to borrow in brokered interbank markets in the US.

The market-oriented approach promoted by the European Central Bank in the design of its refinancing operations creates incentives to credit institutions to use actively the interbank market to manage their liquidity needs. In this context, we examine the ability of the overnight segment to guarantee the timely provision of unsecured funds to banks to smoothly absorb their liquidity shocks. This paper specifically focuses on the speed of reversion of transaction costs and available depth to their equilibrium levels in this market for overnight unsecured funds. The reported evidence points to time-varying liquidity adjustments and identifies liquidity, market activity and the institutional setting of the ECB’s refinancing operations as significant determinants of the observed resiliency regimes. Our analysis also shows how the speed of mean reversion of market liquidity, by affecting the level and the volatility of the overnight market rate, also affects the anchoring of the yield curve in the euro area.

We use cross-country data on a sample of large European banks to evaluate the impact of government ownership on bank risk. We distinguish between default risk (likelihood of creditors’ losses) and operating risk (likelihood of negative equity). Our analysis is based on the joint use of issuer ratings, a synthetic measure of a bank’s probability of default, and individual ratings, which omit the influence of any external support and focus on a bank’s operating risk. We report two main results. First, government-owned banks (GOBs) have lower default risk but higher operating risk than private banks, indicating the presence of governmental protection that induces higher risk taking. Second, GOBs’ operating risk and governmental protection tend to increase in election years. These results are consistent with the idea that GOBs pursue political goals and have important policy implications for recently nationalized European banks.

In our model, financial firms’ leverage choices and asset sales impose negative externalities on other financial firms. This means that individual firms cannot determine their optimal capitalizations in isolation, but have to take the aggregate financial sector characteristics into account. In particular, they become more aggressive when their peers are more conservative. Furthermore, financial firms over-consume liquidity in equilibrium. For some parameter regions, small parameter changes can induce large differences in the equilibrium allocation of risk. Historical experience is not necessarily a good guide as to whether the prevailing equilibrium is fragile or not.

For an international sample of banks, we construct measures of a bank’s absolute size and its systemic size defined as size relative to the national economy. We then examine how a bank’s risk and return on equity, its activity mix and funding strategy, and the extent to which it faces market discipline depend on both size measures. We show that bank returns increase with absolute size, yet decline with systemic size, while neither size measure is associated with bank risk as implicit in the Z-score. These results are consistent with the view that growing to a size that is systemic is not in the interest of bank shareholders. We also find that systemically large banks are subject to greater market discipline as evidenced by a higher sensitivity of their funding costs to risk proxies, consistent with the view that they can become too large to save. A bank’s interest costs, however, are estimated to decline with bank systemic size for all banks apart from those with very low capitalization levels. This suggests that market discipline, exercised through funding costs, does not prevent banks from attaining larger systemic size.

Because bankruptcy is costly for employees, theoretical studies argue that firms with higher leverage have to pay their employees higher wages. In this paper we empirically test this prediction. We find that firm leverage is positively related to the wages of employees, both in the United States and in the Netherlands. In the United States, the positive relation between wages and leverage is strongest in the 21st century, which is a period that also shows a positive relation between wages and unemployment rates. We conclude that the human capital costs of bankruptcy are an important disadvantage of debt.

I examine how US commercial bank loan portfolios change in response to the rise of securitization markets and banking market deregulations over 1976–2003. Banks increasingly tilt their portfolios toward real-estate-backed loans. However, there are significant differences across banks. Larger banks and younger banks disproportionately shift their lending toward real-estate-backed loans, particularly commercial real-estate-backed loans, whereas smaller banks and older banks maintain greater shares of their loan portfolios in commercial and personal loans. When larger banks make more real-estate-backed loans, they charge lower interest rates, consistent with these banks lowering the costs of lending and expanding credit for borrowers. In contrast, smaller banks charge higher interest rates, consistent with these banks restricting lending to a select group of borrowers.

We propose a method for measuring the systemic importance of interconnected banks. In order to capture contributions to system-wide risk, our measure accounts fully for the extent to which a bank (i) propagates shocks across the system and (ii) is vulnerable to propagated shocks. An empirical implementation of this measure and a popular alternative reveals that interconnectedness is a key driver of systemic importance. However, since the two measures reflect the impact of interbank borrowing and lending on system-wide risk differently, they can disagree substantially about the systemic importance of individual banks.

We develop closed-form expressions for the path and speed of stock price discovery in a utility-based CAPM with wealth effects. Two investors with uniquely bounded risk-preferences always apply opposite portfolio rebalancing trades. These trades determine the intra-period path and speed of price discovery in a Walrasian, tâtonnement setup. While conditions for maximum speed exist, convergence is rapid over a wide range of endowments and preferences. Convergence to equilibrium is exponential, and its speed depends on endowments, risk-preferences, firm size, and market price for risk. Convergence is not guaranteed, and the conditions for divergence are specified.

We test whether income from nontraditional banking activities contributed to the failures of hundreds of U.S. commercial banks during the financial crisis. Estimates from a multi-period logit model indicate that the probability of distressed bank failure declined with pure fee-based nontraditional activities such as securities brokerage and insurance sales, but increased with asset-based nontraditional activities such as venture capital, investment banking and asset securitization. Banks that engaged in risky nontraditional activities also tended to take risk in their traditional lines of business, suggesting that deregulation was neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for bank failure during the crisis.