Knowledge that Transforms

Diversification through a financial intermediary has the benefit of transforming loans that need costly monitoring into bank deposits that do not. We show that financial intermediation in a costly state verification model has a cost not yet analyzed: it allows for the existence of multiple equilibria, some of which are characterized by borrowers defaulting on their loans because they expect other borrowers to do the same (i.e. bad equilibria arise due to strategic complementarities in entrepreneurs’ actions). We propose two mechanisms that fully implement the desired equilibrium allocation.

This paper investigates how managerial expertise—specifically, industry expertise—affects firm value through divestiture. Using CEOs’ managerial experiences in industries throughout their careers as a measure of their industry expertise, I find that CEOs in diversified conglomerates are more likely to divest divisions in industries in which they have less experience. This finding is consistent with CEOs who divest such divisions in order to refocus on those divisions in which they have specialized—that is, to achieve a better match between their expertise and their firms’ retained assets. Firms that divest for a better CEO-firm match experience significant improvements in operating performance, as well as significant abnormal stock returns that persist for an average of three years following a divestiture. Further, among firms that divest for a better match, those firms with more experienced CEOs realize greater gains in firm value. In contrast, divestitures that increase corporate focus, but do not improve the expertise-asset match, do not lead to long-run increases in firm value.

This paper uses the framework developed by Helwege and Liang (1996) to investigate the post-listing financing decisions of 221 Chinese state-owned enterprises that were partially privatized via the stock market in 1994–1999. First, we estimate a logit panel data model to examine the decision to raise external funds, either bank loans or equity. Our results show that the probability of raising external finance is positively correlated with the firm’s cash shortage, but only if non-cash working capital is included in the definition of the deficit. In contrast, firms with a cash surplus are less likely to tap external financial markets. Second, we examine the type of security issued and find that default risk negatively affects the probability of completing a stock offering, while firm-level information asymmetries are not significant. Overall, we document some important differences between the firms where the government retained its majority stake and those where it relinquished it; we link these to differences in the firms’ governance and access to financial markets.

Using a unique survey database of 8265 firms from 25 transition economies, I find that lack of access to finance in general, and to bank credit in particular, is associated with significantly lower investment in on-the-job training. This effect is stronger in education-intensive industries and in industries facing good global growth opportunities. To address endogeneity issues, I use the structure of local credit markets as an instrument for credit constraints at the firm-level. In addition, in panel estimates, I control for the presence of unobserved firm-level heterogeneity, as well as for changes in macroeconomic conditions.

We examine changes in banks’ market-to-book ratios over the last decade, focusing on the dramatic and persistent declines witnessed during the financial crisis. The extent of the decline and its persistence cannot be explained by the delayed recognition of losses on existing financial instruments. Rather, it is declines in the values of intangibles – including customer relationships and other intangibles related to business opportunities – along with unrecognized contingent obligations that account for most of the persistent decline in market-to-book ratios. These shifts reflect a combination of changed economic circumstances (e.g., low interest rates reduce the value of core deposits; meager growth opportunities reduce the value of customer relationships) and changed regulatory policies. Together, these changes in the business environment since the financial crisis have led investors to associate little value with intangibles. For example, changing market perceptions of the consequences of leverage have affected the way investors value banks; prior to the crisis, higher leverage, ceteris paribus, was associated with greater value (reflecting the high relative cost of equity finance), but during and after the crisis, as default risk and regulatory concerns came to the fore, lower leverage was associated with greater value. Reflecting the rising importance of regulatory risks (e.g., the uncertain consequences of the Volcker Rule), after controlling for other influences, dividend payments (a signal of management and regulatory perceptions of the persistence of financial strength) matter for market prices much more after the crisis, while increases in recurring fee income matter less.

We demonstrate an inherent conflict between ex ante efficient monitoring and liquidation decisions by outside claimholders. We show it can be useful to commit to inefficient liquidation when monitors fail to produce information: this provides stronger incentives to monitor. The implication for firm capital structure is that more information is generated about firm prospects – and hence firm value increases – when a firm’s cash flow is split into a ‘safe’ claim (debt) and a ‘risky’ claim (equity) compared to when a single claim is sold. We also derive the optimal allocation of control rights between safe and risky claims. This partially resolves the Tirole (2001) puzzle as to why firms issue multiple securities that generate ex post conflicts of interest.

The importance of bank relationships for small firms’ ability to raise external finance is well-documented, yet the mechanism through which relationships improve access to capital markets has received little empirical attention. This paper uses hand-collected, proprietary data from a mid-sized bank in the United States to identify the channels that strengthen the relationship between a small business and its bank. In contrast to earlier work that focuses on the role of relationships in alleviating information and incentive problems in lending, I find that the source of value in relationship banking is not limited to enhanced monitoring. Exploiting a unique feature of this dataset, I examine two channels of relationship strength that directly measure the stream of non-lending profits generated from (1) the non-credit services cross-sold to the borrower, and (2) the additional bank clients referred by the borrower. I document that non-lending profitability empirically determines the risk-adjusted terms of lending. In models of loan price that already include both the bank’s proprietary risk rating and traditional risk proxies, non-lending profits significantly improve explanatory power and account for up to half of the total explained variation. Conditional on risk profile, a one-standard deviation increase in aggregate non-lending profits lowers the loan interest rate by 32 basis points and increases access to credit by 26%.

During the 6-month period from December 2005 to June 2006, the German Real Estate mutual fund industry suffered an unprecedented liquidity crisis. We investigate to what extend competing theories of liquidity crises help explain this event. Our results show that fundamental factors not only mattered for the liquidity outflow in normal times but also during the crisis. However, strategic complementarities accelerated the withdrawals during the crisis suggesting that pure panic behavior contributed substantially to the massive outflows. Thus higher liquidity buffers might help mitigating these tail events. Furthermore, we find that funds with a lower fraction of shares held by institutional investors suffered from less significant outflows suggesting that a segmentation of funds for different investor groups might help mitigate panics.

In this paper, we examine the relationship between banks’ approval for the internal ratings-based (IRB) approaches of Basel II and the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets. Analysing a panel of 115 banks from 21 OECD countries that were eventually approved for applying the IRB to their credit portfolio, we find that risk-weight density becomes lower once regulatory approval is granted. The effect persists when we control for asset structure, and we provide evidence showing that this phenomenon cannot be explained by modelling choices, or improved risk-measurement alone. Consistent with theories of risk-weight manipulation, we find the decline in risk-weights to be particularly pronounced among weakly capitalised banks, where the legal framework for supervision is weak, and in countries where supervisors are overseeing many IRB banks. We conclude that part of the decline in reported riskiness under the IRB results from banks’ strategic risk-modelling.

This paper provides evidence that interbank markets are tiered rather than flat, in the sense that most banks do not lend to each other directly but through money center banks acting as intermediaries. We capture the concept of tiering by developing a core-periphery model, and devise a procedure for fitting the model to real-world networks. Using Bundesbank data on bilateral interbank exposures among 2000 banks from 1999 to 2012, we find strong evidence of tiering in the German banking system. This extent of tiering is unlikely to arise in standard random networks. Indeed, we show that bank specialization and balance sheet variables predict how banks position themselves in the interbank market. This link provides a promising avenue for understanding the formation of financial networks.