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Information Revelation, Lock-In, and Bank Loan Commitments

Journal of Financial Intermediation 1994 3(4), 355-378
This paper considers the extent to which loan commitments mitigate the problems of information monopolies that arise when the firm contracts with a private lender. Loan commitments in conjunction with short-term debt often provide the firm with superior investment incentives by influencing both the states in which bargaining occurs as well as the outcomes from bargaining. Commitment contracts are particularly valuable when there is a high likelihood that information about the firm will be publicly revealed ex post. We also identify circumstances under which the firm foregoes commitment financing, relying on short-term debt instead. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers G21, G32, D82.

Inflationary Policy and Welfare with Limited Credit Markets

Journal of Financial Intermediation 1994 3(3), 245-271
This paper considers the costs and benefits of inflation using a stochastic version of Townsend′s turnpike model in which agents of each type are allowed to remain at a trading post for multiple periods. Numerical results show that moderate rates of inflation can be welfare-improving, but only when private credit markets are extremely limited. More generally, the existence of private credit markets curtails the ability of inflationary policy to do both harm and good. In addition, the welfare consequences of inflation depend on how much information about the economy the government has access to when implementing its policies. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D52, E31.

A Positive Analysis of Bank Closure

Journal of Financial Intermediation 1994 3(3), 272-299 open access
This paper investigates the incentives of a regulator to close depository institutions, recognizing that an institution′s risk taking will be influenced by the regulator′s policy regarding bank closure and that there are opportunity costs in closing banks arising from their intermediation function. The regulator focuses not on the current portfolio of the bank, but on the bank′s future portfolio. Even if the regulator seeks to maximize welfare, the first best is not obtainable because the regulator is unable to credibly commit to certain policies regarding closure. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G2, L5, G1.