Knowledge that Transforms

This paper examines how the legal environment affects financial development, and then asks how this in turn is linked to long-run economic growth. Financial intermediaries are better developed in countries with legal and regulatory systems that (1) give a high priority to creditors receiving the full present value of their claims on corporations, (2) enforce contracts effectively, and (3) promote comprehensive and accurate financial reporting by corporations. The data also indicate that the exogenous component of financial intermediary development—the component defined by the legal and regulatory environment—is positively associated with economic growth. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G21, K12, O16

The paper presents an empirical analysis of the alleged transformation of the financial systems in the three major European economies, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Based on a unified data set developed on the basis of national accounts statistics, and employing a new and consistent method of measurement, the following question is addressed: Is there a general trend toward disintermediation, with banks losing importance to the markets, that is causing these three financial systems to converge? We find that there is neither a general trend toward disintermediation, nor toward a transformation from bank-based to capital market-based financial systems, nor toward a loss of importance of banks. Only in the case of France could strong signs of transformation as well as signs of a general decline in the role of banks be found. Thus the three financial systems also do not seem to be converging. However, there is also a common pattern of change: the intermediation chains are lengthening in all three countries. Nonbank financial intermediaries are taking over a more important role as mobilizers of capital from the nonfinancial sectors. In combination with the trend toward securitization of bank liabilities, this change increases the funding costs of banks and may put banks under pressure. In the case of France, this change is so pronounced that it might even threaten the stability of the financial system. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G21 and G23.

This paper presents a rationale for divestiture consistent with one of the reasons frequently cited by divesting firms, namely, that the firm is undervalued and splitting the firm into its component businesses will make it easier for the market to value the components accurately. When firms are undervalued due to unobservability of divisional cash flows, they may resort to divestiture to raise capital while overvalued firms will use external equity. Diversification thus might result in costly future divestiture. Firms trade off this expected cost of diversification against the benefit of higher levels of cheaper internal capital in deciding the scope of the firm. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D82, G34, L22.

Households and businesses in the U.S. prefer to use checks over less costly means of payment. Earlier studies have focused on check “float” as an explanation for the continued popularity of this seemingly inefficient technology. We construct a general equilibrium model of check payment and show that the presence of float does not necessarily lead to inefficiency. However, we also identify two potential sources of inefficiency associated with check float: (1) if float is not always priced, then it acts as a distorting tax, and (2) inefficiencies can result if people engage in costly activities designed to accelerate check presentment. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E58, G21, G28.

We consider risk-neutral firms that must obtain external finance. They have access to two kinds of stochastic investment opportunities. For one, return realizations are costlessly observed by all agents. For the other, return realizations are costlessly observed only by the investing firm. We examine the optimal allocation of investment between the two projects and the optimal contract used to finance it. The optimal contractual outcome can be supported by appropriate (and determinate) quantities of debt and equity issues. Investments in projects with CSV problems are associated loosely with debt. Investments in projects with observable returns are associated with equity. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G21, E51.

We examine the impact of Rule 10a-1, the Uptick Rule, on short-sell orders sent to the NYSE. The principal finding is that the execution quality of short-sell orders is adversely affected by the Uptick Rule, even when stocks are trading in advancing markets. This is inconsistent with one of the three stated objectives of the rule, i.e., to allow relatively unrestricted short selling when a firm's stock is advancing so that the rule does not affect price discovery during such times. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G18, K22

In this paper we model the dynamic portfolio choice problem facing banks, calibrate the model using empirical data from the banking industry for 1984–1993, and assess quantitatively the impact of recent regulatory developments related to bank capital. The model implies a U-shaped relationship between capital and risk-taking: As a bank's capital increases it first takes less risk, then more risk. A deposit insurance premium surcharge on undercapitalized banks induces them to take more risk. An increased capital requirement, whether flat or risk-based, tends to induce more risk-taking by ex-ante well-capitalized banks that comply with the new standard. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G20, G28.

We develop a model of corporate myopia in which the interaction between asymmetric information and short-term trading by equity holders induces firms to undertake short-term rather than long-term projects, which are intrinsically more valuable. We study the effectiveness of alternative policy prescriptions in eliminating myopia. We show that a capital gains tax cut for long-term equity holders induces optimal project selection; an across-the-board tax cut has no such impact. We characterize the long-term capital gains tax rate which eliminates corporate myopia. Further, we show that a long-term capital gains tax cut does not induce a bias toward inefficient long-term projects when it is, in fact, short-term projects which are more valuable. In contrast, an investment tax credit directed at long-term projects leads to such a bias. Finally, we show that reducing the long-term capital gains tax rate to the level required to eliminate myopic investment behavior may also lead to an increase in government tax revenues.Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: H21, G31, D82.

We compare institutional execution costs across the major U.S. exchanges using a sample of institutional equity orders in firms that switch exchanges. Execution costs including commissions are essentially indistinguishable across these exchanges. We also find the fraction of trading volume from momentum traders is greater on the NYSE than either the Nasdaq or AMEX and that orders are more likely to be worked by an institution's trading desk on the NYSE than on the Nasdaq. These results suggest that institutions actively manage execution strategies, taking into account characteristics of the markets in which they trade.

We analyze price competition between dealers in a security market where the bidding process is sequential. The model provides an interpretation for the evolution of the best ask and bid prices, in between transactions. We find that convergence to the competitive ask and bid prices can take time. The speed of convergence is determined by the frequency with which dealers check their offers and by the tick size. This creates a relationship between the expected trading cost and the timing of offers posted by the dealers. We also find that a zero minimum price variation never minimizes the expected trading cost. Finally, we study the role of time priority. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D43, G10.