Knowledge that Transforms

We investigate whether a firm’s directors’ and officers’ liability insurance contract at the time of the IPO is related to insured firms’ first year post-IPO performance. We find that insurers charge a higher premium per dollar of coverage to protect the directors and officers of firms that will subsequently have poor first year post-IPO stock performance. A higher price of coverage is also associated with a higher post-IPO volatility and lower Sharpe ratio. Our results are robust to various econometric specifications and suggest that even when the high level of information asymmetry inherent to the IPO context prevails, insurers have information about the firms’ prospects that should be valuable to outside investors.

This paper estimates the intraday value of money implicit in the UK unsecured overnight money market. Using transactions data on overnight loans advanced through the UK large value payments system CHAPS in 2003–2009, we find a positive and economically significant intraday interest rate. While the implicit intraday interest rate is quite small pre-crisis, it increases more than tenfold during the financial crisis of 2007–2009. The key interpretation is that an increase in implicit intraday interest rate reflects the increased opportunity cost of pledging collateral intraday and can be used as an indicator to gauge the stress of the payment system. We obtain qualitatively similar estimates of the intraday interest rate by using quoted intraday bid and offer rates and confirm that our results are not driven by the intraday variation in the bid-ask spread.

We examine the performance of ‘predictive’ and ‘reactive’ short sellers who take relatively large short positions immediately before and after quarterly earnings announcements, respectively. While both types short into advancing markets, it is surprising for reactive shorts since their trades are in stocks that just announced unexpected good news and thus, according to the post-earnings announcement drift anomaly, will subsequently have abnormally high cumulative returns. Nevertheless, we find that for both types of short sellers: (1) subsequent cumulative returns are significantly negatively related to the amount of abnormal short selling, suggesting they are informed, and (2) relative to non-earnings dates, the subsequent returns around earnings announcements are significantly more negative, indicating they appear to be adept at exploiting earnings announcements. Surprisingly, we find that the subsequent returns of reactive short sellers are significantly greater than those of predictive short sellers except for S&P 500 stocks, perhaps due to their greater analyst following. Importantly, we are left with two puzzles. First, reactive shorts would have significantly improved their performance had they based their trades on the size of standardized unexpected earnings (‘SUE’). Second, predictive shorts of Micro stocks would have significantly improved their performance had they simply waited until earnings were announced and then based their trades on SUE.

This paper develops a theory in which housing prices, the capital structures of banks (mortgage lenders) and the capital structures of mortgage borrowers are all endogenously determined in equilibrium. There are four main results. First, leverage is a “positively correlated” phenomenon in that high leverage among borrowers is positively correlated with high leverage among banks, and higher house prices lead to higher leverage for both. The intuition is that first-time homebuyers with fixed wealth endowments must borrow more to buy more expensive homes, whereas higher current house prices rationally imply higher expected future house prices and therefore higher collateral values on bank loans, inducing banks to be more highly levered. Second, higher bank leverage leads to greater house price volatility in response to shocks to fundamental house values. Third, a bank’s exposure to credit risk depends not only on its own leverage but also on the leverage decisions of other banks. Fourth, positive fundamental shocks to house prices dilute financial intermediation by reducing banks’ pre-lending screening, and this reduction in bank screening further increases house prices. Empirical and policy implications of the analysis are drawn out, and empirical evidence is provided for the first two main results. The key policy implications are that greater geographic diversification by banks, tying mortgage tax exemptions to the duration of home ownership, and increasing bank capital requirements when borrower leverage is high can help reduce house price volatility.

Diversification by banks affects the systemic risk of the sector. Importantly, Wagner (2010) shows that linear diversification increases systemic risk. We consider the case of securitization, whereby loan portfolios are sliced into tranches with different seniority levels. We show that tranching offers nonlinear diversification strategies, which can reduce the failure risk of individual institutions beyond the minimum level attainable by linear diversification without increasing systemic risk.

There is wide agreement that before the recent financial crisis, financial institutions took excessive risk in their investment strategies. At the same time, regulators complained that banks did not reveal the extent of their difficulties in a timely fashion thus reducing the effectiveness of government intervention to prevent or mitigate the deleterious effects of the financial crisis. The purpose of this paper is to investigate how regulators can best use certain tools at their disposal to motivate banks to take less risk and to provide adverse information to regulators early. We argue that two tools, namely (i) allowing bank payouts to equity holders even when banks report they are in trouble and (ii) constraining banks’ future investment strategy when they are in trouble can achieve both goals. We show that, in some cases, it is optimal to use both of these tools in combination. That is, in such cases it is optimal to allow equity payouts when banks report they are in trouble, even though such payouts increase the incentive for banks to take excessive risk and even though these payments are financed by taxpayers. We also show that the more socially costly is constraining the bank’s portfolio selection or the more complex are the bank’s assets, the more likely it is that allowing larger payouts and fewer constraints is optimal. Finally we discuss how changes in bank capital requirements interact with inducing disclosure and preventing excessive risk taking.

We study optimal lending behavior in situations where borrowers’ outside options increase with their creditworthiness. Creditworthiness is private information of borrowers. Lenders use collateral as a screening mechanism to address this adverse selection problem. A lender seeking to attract creditworthy borrowers with high reservation payoffs (while screening out uncreditworthy types) must offer contracts with sufficiently low interest rates and, consequently, high collateral requirements. Because higher collateral requirements raise screening costs, however, lenders favor pooling uncreditworthy borrowers over screening them—in essence, a lowering of credit standards. Lending costs determine break-even offers that rival incumbents can offer borrowers. Accordingly, a lender faces borrowers whose reservation payoffs depend on the lender’s cost advantage over rival incumbent lenders. Our results imply that screening is more likely to occur in markets with a greater disparity in lending costs. Conversely, when funding markets are intensely competitive, lenders are more likely to resort to pooling. This paper also rationalizes the phenomenon of cream-skimming by outside (foreign) lenders as an equilibrium of the model. Surprisingly, we find that the presence of an informed rival actually facilitates cream-skimming by an uninformed lender.

We examine the effect of liability protection on the compensation of directors and on takeover outcomes. Consistent with the hypothesis that directors require additional compensation if they bear liability, we find that director compensation is higher for firms that provide less liability protection. Examining takeovers, we find evidence that takeovers of firms with protected directors are less likely to succeed. Moreover, firms with protected directors are more likely to accept a lower bid premium, and this finding is consistent with protected directors having reduced incentives to negotiate for the highest possible price during the acquisition. Overall, the results are consistent with the notion that director liability provisions have a significant impact both on director compensation and director duty.

Using a sample that provides unprecedented detail on foreign listings for 29 exchanges in 24 countries starting from the early 1980s, we show that although firms list in countries with better investor protection, they are less likely to list in countries with excessively stronger investor protection. We provide evidence based on ex ante firm and market characteristics and ex post listing outcomes that our findings are due to lack of investor interest in firms from environments with much weaker investor protection. We also argue that our findings, together with a general trend of improvement in investor protection in many firms’ countries of origin, can explain why US and UK exchanges have attracted an increasing number of foreign listings during our sample period.

What market features of financial risk transfer exacerbate counterparty risk? To analyze this, we formulate a model which elucidates important differences between financial risk transfer and traditional insurance, using the example of Credit Default Swaps (CDS). We allow for (heterogeneous) insurer insolvency, which captures the possibility that relatively risky counterparties may exist in the market. Further, we find that stable insurers become less stable as the price of the contract decreases. The analysis includes insured parties that have heterogeneous motivations for purchasing CDS. For example, some may own the underlying asset and purchase CDS for risk management, while others buy these contracts purely for trading purposes. We show that traders will choose to contract with less stable insurers, resulting in higher counterparty risk in this market relative to that of traditional insurance; however, a regulatory policy that removes traders can, perversely, cause stable counterparties to become less stable. We conclude with two extensions of the model that consider a Central Counterparty (CCP) arrangement and the consequences of asymmetric information over insurer type.