Knowledge that Transforms

Exploiting unique, time-varying, bilateral data on bank ownership for many countries, we show that exports tend to be larger when a foreign bank from the importing country is present. Entry of a foreign bank also boosts export growth to the home country of the foreign bank relative to other countries, especially when foreign bank presence in the country is large and bilateral cross-border lending low. We find supportive evidence that foreign banks facilitate trade by reducing financial frictions for firms. Entry spurs exports to the foreign bank's home country especially in sectors more dependent on external finance, and particularly so in countries less economically and financially developed and with a higher share of foreign banks. Imports of external finance dependent sectors also grow more after entry, but less so than exports do. Exit of a foreign bank does not fully eliminate the beneficial effects of prior foreign bank presence on exports.

The COVID-19 pandemic caused a global health and economic crisis to which governments responded with massive policy interventions. Using Brazil as a testing ground, we investigate the influence of the pandemic and ensuing policy interventions on local credit markets. First, we find that the pandemic has a significantly negative impact on local credit. Second, using a novel manually collected database on the staggered municipal government policy interventions, we show heterogenous effects of interventions: positive effects of soft interventions (e.g., social distancing and mass gathering restrictions) and late reopening, and negative effects of hard interventions (e.g., closure of non-essential services) and early reopening. Third, we find that state-owned banks grant more local credit than privately owned banks during the COVID-19 crisis but this difference is less pronounced than it was in the 2008 Financial Crisis. We confirm our results using pre-pandemic local political preference as instrument for policy interventions and orthogonalized policy intervention indicators, and in placebo tests.

The European Central Bank's large-scale asset purchase program targeted safe assets, but also aimed to impact prices of risky assets. The mechanism for this is the “portfolio rebalancing channel”, where financial institutions’ portfolio decisions impact financial prices more broadly. We examine this mechanism using cross-sectional heterogeneity in how the financial portfolios of different sectors of the European economy were affected around the purchase program. We find evidence of rebalancing. In vulnerable countries, where macroeconomic unbalances and relatively high risk premia remained, we document rebalancing towards riskier securities. In less vulnerable countries, based on granular information for large European banks, we document rebalancing toward bank loans.

We develop a model of liquidity shortages that incorporates a general equilibrium feature of liquidity: when banks hold more liquidity, other agents in the economy hold less of it and will supply less in times of crisis. We show that the private holdings of liquidity at banks are inefficient, with the direction of the bias being determined by the characteristics of the suppliers of liquidity to banks. Minimum liquidity requirements for banks may reduce welfare; in such cases interest rate policies that stimulate the ex-post supply of liquidity can restore efficiency. Overall, our results show that optimal liquidity policies critically depend on a financial institution’s (marginal) source of liquidity and will hence differ across institutions of different types.

We develop a conceptual framework that links the compensation incentives of bank executives to the risk and return externalities generated by banks but borne by society. Using 1994 to 2016 data from large U.S. commercial banks, we find that CEO pay-performance incentives reduce both negative systemic risk externalities and positive liquidity creation externalities, while pay-risk incentives increase both externalities. Our findings offer support for Federal Reserve guidelines that encourage greater reliance on long-term equity-based compensation, and they infer a regulatory tradeoff: Bank executive pay rules aimed at reducing systemic risk will result in reduced system-wide liquidity creation as well.

We conduct an extensive study of underpricing in the euro area bond market and find strong evidence of underpricing. In cross-sectional regressions we find patterns that are consistent with bookbuilding-based theories of underpricing and inconsistent with liquidity-based explanations. The underpricing has increased considerably during the financial crisis and has remained at an elevated level since. We also show that secondary market liquidity in the euro area bond market is significantly lower in the post-crisis period than pre-crisis. These results are consistent with recent US evidence and may represent unintended side effects of new regulation enacted in the wake of the financial crisis, such as Basel III and the Volcker Rule. Furthermore, our evidence suggests that the ECB’s corporate sector purchase programs has led to a decrease in underpricing.

Private investments in public equities (PIPEs) are an important source of finance for public corporations. PIPE investor returns decline with holding periods, while time to exit depends on the issue's registration status and underlying liquidity. We estimate PIPE investor returns adjusting for these factors. Our analysis, which is the first to estimate returns to investors rather than issuers, indicates that the average PIPE investor holds the stock for 384 days and earns an abnormal return of 19.7%. More constrained firms tend to issue PIPEs to hedge funds and private equity funds in offerings that have higher expected returns and higher volatility. PIPE investors’ abnormal returns appear to reflect compensation for providing capital to financially constrained firms.

As a result of the Basel II reforms, capital requirements on UK mortgages fell substantially in coincidence with the financial crisis. We exploit a novel, loan-level dataset on within-lender variation in risk-weighted capital requirements and a triple-difference identification strategy to estimate the pass through of capital requirements to mortgage rates. We find that a 1pp lower risk-weighted capital requirement leads to a reduction in rates by 10–16bp on average, with stronger effects for less-capitalized lenders. The competitive advantage induced by multi-tier regulation also affects the composition of banks mortgage portfolios, with larger lenders specializing in lower risk loans. Finally, our results support the use of countercyclical capital requirements to sustain lending in a crisis.

We examine how the threat of disclosure (stigma) changes the quality of banks that approach emergency lending facilities. We study a financial crisis where two confidential facilities were available to banks. Unexpectedly, a partial list of bank names from one facility was published, suddenly stigmatizing that facility. We find that the composition of banks that approached each facility changed, where the newly stigmatized facility attracted weaker banks that maintained smaller liquidity buffers, while the alternative confidential facility attracted both weaker and stronger banks. Our results shed light on how stigma prevents regulators from reaching many banks to inject critical liquidity into the banking sector during a crisis.

Using regulatory data on CDS holdings and corporate bond transactions, I provide evidence for a liquidity spillover effect from CDS to bond markets. Bond trading volumes are 70% larger for investors with CDS positions written on the debt issuer. Moreover, higher CDS trading activity substantially improves the liquidity of the underlying bonds, particularly around rating downgrades. Additional analyses reveal that the spillover effect is partly driven by naked CDS positions, highlighting one of the adverse consequences of naked CDS bans for bond markets. The results suggest that the presence of an accessible CDS market enhances the liquidity of the underlying bond market.