Knowledge that Transforms

The size and the leverage of financial market investors and the elasticity of demand of unlevered investors define MinMaSS, the smallest market size that can support a given degree of leverage. The financial system’s potential for financial crises can be measured by the stability ratio, the ratio of total market size to MinMaSS. We use that financial stability metric to gauge the buildup of vulnerability in the run-up to the 1998 Long-Term Capital Management crisis and argue that policymakers could have detected the potential for the crisis.

Social relationship and business connections create implicit benefits between borrowers and lenders. We model how implicit benefits and repayment enforcement costs influence credit allocation, cost, and renegotiation. The optimal solution illustrates that financing with implicit benefits may achieve lower financing costs, higher managerial effort, and better outcomes for both borrowers and lenders. This result is consistent with the continuing expansion of alternative financing despite formal financial intermediation, the rise of corporate insider debt, and joint ownership of debt and equity. The growing size and complexity of projects and changes in community relationships can explain expansion of financing with standard intermediation.

We study whether bank bailouts affect CEO turnover and its subsequent impact on bank risk. Exploiting the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) of 2008, we find that TARP funds temporarily decreased the likelihood of bank CEO turnover during the crisis (2008–2010) but significantly increased CEO changes afterwards. Our results show that replacing TARP CEOs reduced individual bank's risk as well as the bank's contributions to the systemic risk. Finally, we find that TARP CEO turnover was mainly driven by a decrease in the bank's political capital. Overall we provide evidence that bank bailouts have important implications for banks’ risk-taking and systemic risk, insofar as bailouts affect bank CEO turnover.

This paper studies the efficiency of competitive equilibria in economies where the expansion of investment is facilitated by securitization. We show that the use of securitization is generally associated with constrained inefficient aggregate investment, thereby potentially justifying regulatory intervention in markets for securitized assets. We examine the effectiveness of two real-world policy instruments to address this inefficiency: ex-ante capital / leverage requirements, as well as skin-in-the game (retention) requirements. We find that leverage/capital restrictions can increase welfare in our environment, but that forcing originators to hold additional skin-in-the game is not welfare improving.

Using U.S. interstate banking deregulations, we identify the effect of market-entering banks’ prior industry exposures on the manufacturing sector growth in the new state that they enter. We create banking integration and industry specialization measures that consider both direct (state-pair) as well as indirect (tertiary-state) links created by expanding multi-bank holding company networks. First, consistent with the economic mechanism we have in mind, we observe that banks’ home state's industrial specialization is positively correlated with their lending specialization when participating to in-state as well as out-of-state syndicated loan markets. Then, focusing on industry value added at the state-industry-level, we find evidence consistent with the positive impact of market-entering banks’ prior exposure to a sector on the growth of that industry in the newly-entered state. The observed effect is larger when the state-pair-level discrepancy in sector-specialization is greater. Our findings are robust and hold in capital-related components of industry-level value added. We observe that the above results are more prominent in sectors that are more external finance dependent, have lower amounts of physical capital that can be pledged as collateral, generate more valuable patents, are durables-producers, and have a higher risk. Our findings suggest that a bank integration channel helps shape states’ industrial landscape.

We evaluate how the liquidity coverage rule affects US banks’ opacity and funding liquidity risk. Banks subject to the rule become significantly more opaque and funding liquidity risk increases by $245 million per quarter. Higher funding liquidity risk is more pronounced among banks that are subject to the rule’s more stringent liquidity buffers, and systemically riskier banks. Rising opacity reflects an increase in banks’ holdings of complex assets whose value is difficult to communicate to investors. The evidence highlights the unintended consequences of liquidity regulation and is consistent with theoretical models’ predictions of a trade-off between liquidity buffers and bank opacity that exacerbates funding liquidity risk.

We investigate the equilibrium interest rate charges on non-recourse and recourse loans secured by stock. In such loans, the client retains the option to prepay and recover the collateral stock. We adopt a structural model of the firm where debt levels, with endogenous bankruptcy, affect equity dynamics. Complicating matters, the link between total equity and the price of a share of stock that forms the collateral depends on the extent of dilutions and buybacks that occur. For levered firms, due to dilution in bad states of nature, stock prices typically fall faster than equity values; and for firms that engage in buybacks in good states of nature, stock prices will rise faster than equity values. Banks that ignore these features underestimate the equilibrium interest rate charge on stock-based loans. We provide an analysis of individual stock-based loans and their portfolio characteristics, the latter of which can be used by banks to ascertain capital requirements.

Are more informative credit ratings always preferred and how should regulators intervene to promote investment efficiency? To answer these questions, we develop a model in which a manager seeks financing for a project. The main frictions are that the manager is privately informed about the project’s quality and cannot commit not to divert resources away from it. This setting gives rise to a feedback effect in which creditors’ beliefs about whether the manager diverts resources can become self-fulfilling. A critical consequence of this feedback effect is that more precise ratings can be detrimental for investment efficiency. Intuitively, by revealing that a firm is of worse quality and increasing its cost of finance, more informative ratings strengthen the manager’s incentive to withdraw resources away from the project and default. We show that the regulation of credit rating agencies should be lenient during good times and strict during bad times.

This study examines how the composition of an investment adviser's client base (identified via Form ADV filings) relates to the performance of its mutual funds. Investment advisers catering to institutional clients realize statistically and economically superior risk-adjusted mutual fund performance relative to retail-oriented advisers. Subsequent tests identify the channel(s) responsible for the relationship. The evidence is consistent with both a governance mechanism (i.e., Evans and Fahlenbrach 2012) as well as inefficiencies stemming from the costly search mechanism of Gârleanu and Pedersen's (2018) model for asset management. The results suggest that institutional clients can identify better performing investment managers, particularly in market segments where retail mutual fund investors face higher search costs.

The rise of investments professionally managed with a socially responsible mandate has generated growing interest in environmental and social ratings. However, it is not clear how informative these ratings are or whether they are distorted by greenwashing. Based on the ratings of the leading provider, I offer the first evidence linking greenwashing to ratings inflation. Better ratings do not predict less future corporate bad behavior. This is of concern because it undermines the signaling value of these ratings. To understand these results, I develop a model where the rating agency may underinvest in greenwashing detection while firms have incentives to window dress and engage in greenwashing. Finally, controlling for greenwashing improves ratings predictive quality.