Knowledge that Transforms

Since the early 2000s, macroprudential policy has increasingly become part of the regulatory and supervisory framework. Likewise, the housing market has been at the center of the debate on systemic financial risk prevention. Among macroprudential tools, the purpose of the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio is to constrain mortgage loan creation. This paper is unique in that it analyzes the effectiveness of LTV on mortgage lending moderation using a large sample of more than 4000 banks from 46 countries. The analysis suggests mortgage loans have been successfully curbed in countries with a LTV policy. Size and non-performing loans are the two key characteristics to the effectiveness of LTV. When nonlinearities are considered, the average effect of LTV can be very large; however, it becomes much less effective with large banks and banks with bad loans. Our results suggest the inclusion of other macroprudential tools may have complementary effects to LTV, and for large size banks in particular.

This paper provides novel empirical evidence showing that foreign financial developments are a powerful predictor of domestic banking crises. Using a new data set for 38 advanced and emerging economies over 1970–2011, we show that credit growth in the rest of the world has a large positive effect on the probability of banking crises taking place at home, even when controlling for domestic credit growth. Our results suggest that this effect is larger for financially open economies, and is consistent with transmission via cross-border capital flows and market sentiment. Direct contagion from foreign crises plays an important role, but does not account for the whole effect.

In the UK, between 1955 and 1970, dual class shares quickly lost popularity without any regulatory intervention. The decline in the use of dual class shares was positively correlated with the relative valuations of one-share-one-vote and dual class firms, which in turn was related to media pessimism on the use of dual class shares. Following periods with high relative valuations of one-share-one-vote, one-share-one-vote firms exhibited lower returns than dual class firms suggesting that the latter were undervalued. These and other results suggest that investor demand may lead firms to abandon dual class shares.

Prior empirical investigations of corporate failures consider the effects of macroeconomic conditions and financial health, but the literature contains limited evidence of the real effects of the bank shocks caused by the sovereign debt crisis. Using a rich source of high-quality firm-bank matched data for 2005–2014, this study examines the real effects of bank shocks on firms’ survival prospects in Portugal. We first present evidence that a funding outflow is associated with a reduction in the credit supply. Furthermore, firms borrowing from banks exposed to the funding outflow are more likely to fail. We also uncover significant heterogeneity in firms’ financial positions and show that the negative effect of a funding shock is stronger for younger, higher-risk firms, and those that used their potential lines of bank credit.

We analyzed the loan guarantees that the Japanese government provided for banks’ loans to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). We modeled and estimated how much and under what conditions loan guarantees affected banks’ risk-taking and banks’ non-guaranteed lending. In the presence of controls for bank capital and other factors that might affect supplies of bank credit, our estimates supported our model's implications that loan guarantees increased banks’ risk-taking. Consistent with our model, our estimates imply that, when banks initially had fewer guaranteed loans and then got more guaranteed loans, guaranteed loans were complements to, rather than substitutes for, non-guaranteed loans. As complements, loan guarantees could be “high-powered” in that they generated increases not only in guaranteed loans, but also increases in non-guaranteed loans that were a multiple of the increases in guaranteed loans. In addition, banks’ having more capital was associated with doing more non-guaranteed lending.

I use a unique institutional feature of money market funds to identify whether funds hold additional liquidity to guard against and prevent potential investor runs. Specifically, some funds are used as a cash management vehicle for related entities, such as other funds in the fund family. These “internal” funds should experience less outflows during market stress, and should thus have less need to hold this additional liquidity. Indeed, these “internal” prime money market funds do hold lower liquidity than other prime funds. This effect is most pronounced at quarter ends, when there is an exogenous reduction in cash demand from non-US bank dealers.

We examine the effects on IPO uncertainty of an alternative going-public mechanism – the two-stage IPO, where a firm first gets quoted on the OTC market, and then upgrades to a national exchange where it first issues public equity. We find that a two-stage IPO firm experiences lower underpricing and return volatility than does a similar traditional IPO firm. Our study is the first to analyze the impact of U.S. pre-IPO disclosure and liquidity on levels of uncertainty and pricing at the IPO stage. We find that greater disclosure and liquidity during the first stage leads to greater reduction in IPO uncertainty. We control for the potentially endogenous nature of the two-stage IPOs by using a difference-in-difference analysis that utilizes two exogenous OTC market events.

This study shows the importance of return discrimination between funds in the flow-performance relationship. To do so, we employ objective-adjusted returns rather than performance ranks. We demonstrate that the net flow-performance relationship is a direct consequence of the convex inflow- and outflow-performance relationships, and that fund size and age have no significant effect on these relationships. When we measure past performance using 12-month objective-adjusted returns, we find a linear net flow-performance relationship after controlling for the investor-substitution effect.

Financial institutions are financed by both investors and customers. Investors expect an appropriate risk-adjusted return for providing financing and risk bearing. Customers, in contrast, provide financing in exchange for specific services, and want the service fulfillment to be free of the intermediary's credit risk. We develop a framework that defines the roles of customers and investors in intermediaries, and use it to build an economic theory that has the following main findings. First, with positive net social surplus in the intermediary-customer relationship, the efficient (first best) contract completely insulates the customer from the intermediary's credit risk, thereby exposing the customer only to the risk inherent in the contract terms. Second, when intermediaries face financing frictions, the second-best contract may expose the customer to some intermediary credit risk, generating “customer contract fulfillment” costs. Third, the efficiency loss associated with these costs in the second best rationalizes government guarantees like deposit insurance even when there is no threat of bank runs. We further discuss the implications of this customer-investor nexus for numerous issues related to the design of contracts between financial intermediaries and their customers, the sharing of risks between them, ex ante efficient institutional design, regulatory practices, and the evolving boundaries between banks and financial markets.

This paper studies rehypothecation, a practice in which financial institutions re-pledge collateral pledged to them by their clients. Rehypothecation enhances provision of funding liquidity to the economy, but it also incurs deadweight cost by misallocating the asset among the agents when counterparties fail. We examine the possibility of a conflict between the intermediary and its borrower on rehypothecation arrangements. The direction of this conflict depends on haircuts of the contract between them: if the contract involves over-collateralization, there tends to be an excessive use of rehypothecation, and if the contract involves under-collateralization, there tends to be an insufficient use of rehypothecation. This offers an empirical prediction of a link between the size of haircut in collateralized financial contracts, borrower information, and the likelihood of rehypothecation.