This paper investigates bank stock performance following different monetary policy actions in times of positive and negative interest rates. Controlling for the broader stock market, monetary policy announcements that cause an unanticipated downward shift in the yield curve and a flattening of the shorter-end of the yield curve are found to persistently reduce bank stock prices once the interest rate environment is negative. Consistent with the deposits channel of monetary policy, the effects are larger and more persistent for banks that are relatively dependent on deposit funding. By contrast, a surprise movement in the slope of the longer-end of the yield curve does not impact bank stock prices in times of negative interest rates. Accounting data confirm that a parallel drop in the yield curve following a monetary policy decision in a negative interest rate environment hurts banks through shrinking deposit margins.

We examine aftermarket transactions for closed-end fund IPOs and document large sell-to-buy imbalances (“flipping”), extensive price stabilization, and sharp subsequent price drops. The timing of the price drop is related to both the amount of initial flipping, and use of the over-allotment options. The extent of the flipping activity is related to the composition of the syndicate. Moreover, aftermarket buys (sells) are mainly small (large) trades. These findings suggest that lead underwriters price stabilize and manage the supply of shares in the aftermarket, and that closed-end fund IPOs are marketed to a poorly informed public.

Using a comprehensive dataset from German banks, we document the usage of sovereign credit default swaps (CDS) during the European sovereign debt crisis of 2008–2013. Banks used the sovereign CDS market to extend, rather than hedge, their long exposures to sovereign risk during this period. Lower loan exposure to sovereign risk is associated with greater protection selling in CDS, the effect being weaker when sovereign risk is high. Bank and country risk variables are mostly not associated with protection selling. The findings are driven by the actions of a few non-dealer banks which sold CDS protection aggressively at the onset of the crisis, but started covering their positions at its height while simultaneously shifting their assets towards sovereign bonds and loans. Our findings underscore the importance of accounting for derivatives exposure in building a complete picture and understanding fully the economic drivers of the bank-sovereign nexus of risk.

We assess the effects of board gender quota laws using a sample of banks from 39 countries. We document an increase in both stand-alone and systemic risk post-quota among banks that did not meet the quota pre-reform; the effect is stronger for banks in countries with a smaller pool of women in finance and low gender equality. We find that the propagation of poor governance practices by overlapping female directors and deterioration in the information environment post quota are likely channels driving the results. The evidence is consistent with some banks “gaming” the reform by strategically appointing insiders, which weakens the board's monitoring function. Our results have policy implications and suggest that supply-side factors are key determinants of the outcome of mandated quotas.

The high-tech sector accounts for the majority of corporate innovation in modern economies. In a sample of 38 countries, we document a strong positive relation between the initial size of the country's high-tech sector and subsequent rates of GDP and total factor productivity growth. We also find a strong positive connection between a country's equity (but not credit) market development and the size of its high-tech sector. Our main difference-in-differences estimates show that better developed stock markets support faster growth of innovative-intensive, high-tech industries. The main channels for this effect are higher rates of productivity and faster growth in the number of new high-tech firms. Credit market development fosters growth in industries that rely on external finance for physical capital accumulation but is unimportant for growth in innovation-intensive industries. These findings show that stock markets and credit markets play important but distinct roles in supporting economic growth. Stock markets are uniquely suited for financing technology-led growth, a particularly important concern for advanced economies.

We examine the hypothesis that fluctuations in the aggregate supply of bank loans influence the supply of new equity capital. Using residual lending standards as a clean measure of aggregate loan supply and a VAR framework to aid identification, we find that a one-standard-deviation shock to lending standards results in 15% fewer IPOs. Shocks elicit strong responses from IPO-firms that are highly dependent on external capital and increase the number of withdrawals, strengthening the interpretation that the above is driven by changes in the supply of equity. Our results suggest that credit conditions are important to a well-functioning IPO market.

In 1936–37, the Federal Reserve doubled member banks’ reserve requirements. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) famously argued that the doubling increased reserve demand and forced the money supply to contract, which they argued caused the recession of 1937–38. Using a new database on individual banks, we find that higher reserve requirements did not generally increase banks’ reserve demand or contract lending because reserve requirements were not binding for most banks. Aggregate effects on credit supply from reserve requirement increases were therefore economically small and statistically zero.

We examine the real effects of changes in bank mortgage loan underwriting standards by combining responses to the Federal Reserve’s Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey, application information from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, and local housing market measures over 1990 to 2013. Tightened standards are associated with a 1 percentage point increase in denial rates and a 5% fall in loan issuance, controlling for applicant pool changes, but no change for predominantly-securitizing banks. In areas with more exposure to banks that have tightened standards, mortgage delinquency rates, house prices, new home sales, and residential construction employment fall substantially.

We use a unique dataset to show that relationships are an important determinant of banks' ability to access interbank market liquidity. More precisely, we find that: (i) banks with a larger reserve imbalance are more likely to borrow funds from banks with whom they have a relationship, and to pay a lower interest rate than otherwise; (ii) smaller banks and banks with more non-performing loans tend to have limited access to international markets, and rely more on relationships; (iii) relationships are established between banks with less correlated liquidity shocks. These results suggest that relationships allow banks to insure liquidity risk in the presence of market frictions such as transaction and information costs. Our analysis explicitly controls for the endogeneity of bank relationships.

Predictions of firm-level credit spreads based on the current spot and forward credit spreads can be significantly improved upon by using the information contained in the shape of the credit-spread curve. However, the current credit-spread curve is not a sufficient statistic for predicting future out-of-sample credit spreads; predictions can be significantly improved upon by exploiting the information contained in the shape of the riskless yield curve. In the presence of credit-spread and riskless factors, other macroeconomic, marketwide, and firm-specific risk variables do not significantly improve predictions of credit spreads. These results have important implications for credit-spreads modeling as well as for better understanding corporate capital structure and risk management policies.