Knowledge that Transforms

This paper tests whether an increase in insured deposits causes banks to become more risky. We use variation introduced by the U.S. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act in October 2008, which increased the deposit insurance coverage from 100,000 to 250,000 per depositor and bank. For some banks, the amount of insured deposits increased significantly; for others, it was a minor change. Our analysis shows that the more affected banks increase their investments in risky commercial real estate loans and become more risky relative to unaffected banks following the change. This effect is most distinct for affected banks that are low capitalized.

We explore the trading decisions of equity mutual funds during ten periods of extreme market uncertainty. We find that mutual funds reduced their aggregate holdings of illiquid stocks. Exploring the drivers behind this result reveals that this is mainly driven by larger withdrawals from funds that hold less liquid stocks. We further find that the sell-off of illiquid stocks occurred only after initial deterioration in market conditions, consistent with retail investors’ response to bad performance. At a broader level, this shows that mutual funds consumed liquidity during periods where liquidity was most valuable. Moreover, the fact that fund managers traded in response to these withdrawals suggests a potentially magnifying channel for the drop in illiquid stock prices, also known as flight-to-liquidity.

This paper examines the association between the default risk of foreign bank subsidiaries in developing countries and their parents during the global financial crisis, with the purpose of determining the size and sign of this correlation and, more importantly, understanding what factors can help insulate affiliates from their parents. We find evidence of a significant and robust positive correlation between parent banks’ and foreign subsidiaries’ default risk. This correlation is lower for subsidiaries that have a higher share of retail deposit funding and that are more independently managed from their parents. Host country bank regulations are also associated with the extent to which shocks to the parents affect the subsidiaries’ default risk. In particular, the correlation between the default risk of subsidiaries and their parents is lower for subsidiaries operating in countries that impose higher capital, reserve, provisioning, and disclosure requirements, and tougher restrictions on bank activities.

This paper studies the effects of hedge disclosure requirements on corporate risk management and product market competition. The analysis is based on a model of market entry and shows that to prevent entry incumbent firms engage in risk management when these activities remain unobserved by outsiders. In the resulting equilibrium, financial markets are well informed and entry is efficient. However, potential attempts for more transparency by additional disclosure requirements introduce a commitment device that provides incumbents with incentives to distort risk management activities thereby influencing entrant beliefs. In equilibrium, firms engage in significant risk-taking. This behavior limits entry and adversely affects the nature of competition in industries.

We provide a tractable model of counterparty risk in a risk transfer market, and analyze the consequences of this risk being private information. We show that unknown type information can be revealed in the presence of a large trader identification policy; however, the market allocation is shown to be constrained inefficient. The inefficiency is highlighted by considering the imposition of a transaction tax, which can improve welfare by encouraging more information revelation and increasing risk transfer. The results suggest that increased transparency and/or central counterparty arrangements in over-the-counter derivative markets may promote transparency of counterparty risk.

We find that certain bank characteristics—aggressive credit growth, less reliance on deposit funding, and size—prior to the 2007−2009 crisis are consistently related to the systemic dimensions of bank risk during the crisis. Exposures to real estate play a major role explaining this relationship: Banks with larger real estate betas exhibited higher levels of systemic risk during the crisis. The impact of real estate betas on systemic risk increases for larger banks, following aggressive credit growth policies in the presence of housing bubbles. We show that the relationship between bank characteristics and risk could also be detected using measures of systemic risk calculated prior to the financial crisis.

Using a comprehensive survey, we show that investors with a larger capital allocation to private equity are more specialized−measured by the degree to which the investor focuses on private equity rather than other classes of investments−and have a wider scope of due diligence and investment activities. Other investor characteristics (experience, type, location, compensation structure, number of funds under management) play no role. In particular, endowments are not special according to the survey measures. These results are consistent with the changing LP–GP relationship in private equity as capital is increasingly concentrated in the hands of large investors.

We present evidence that the Federal Reserve stress tests produce information about both the stress-tested bank holding companies and the overall state of the banking industry. Our evidence goes beyond a standard event study, which cannot differentiate between small abnormal returns and large, but opposite-signed, abnormal stock returns. We find that stress test disclosures are associated with significantly higher absolute abnormal returns, as well as higher abnormal trading volume. More levered and riskier holding companies seem to be more affected by the stress test information. We find no evidence that stress test disclosures have reduced the production of private information. After disclosure begins, stress tested firms attract equity analysts without changing analysts’ forecast dispersions or their mean forecast error.