Knowledge that Transforms

We study the transmission of negative interest rates to bank lending around an unexpected policy rate cut into deep negative territory by the Swiss National Bank (−0.75%). We exploit a rich data set on transaction-level corporate loans matched with bank balance sheet data. We find that banks more affected by negative interest rates offer looser lending terms and lend more than other banks. This result is consistent with the risk-taking channel, where a lower policy rate spurs bank risk-taking to maintain profits. The result implies that, even in such deep negative territory, the reversal rate has not yet been hit.

We analyze reductions in bank credit using a natural experiment where unprecedented flooding in Pakistan differentially affected banks that were more exposed to the floods. Using a unique data set that covers the universe of consumer loans in Pakistan and this exogenous shock to bank funding, we find two key results. First, following an increase in their funding costs, banks disproportionately reduce credit to borrowers with little education, little credit history, and seasonal occupations. Second, the credit reduction is not compensated by relatively more lending by less-affected banks. The empirical evidence suggests that a reduction in bank monitoring incentives caused the large relative decreases in lending to these borrowers.

We show that banks expand mortgage lending in the home states of Senate Banking Committee chairs, and the effect is more pronounced in counties where the incumbent senator faces a competitive re-election race. Banks strategically target politically active borrowers. Consequently, banks’ profitability increases after favoring the incumbent politicians’ constituents, but they suffer a deterioration in mortgage asset quality in the long run. Our findings imply that political power could distort private capital allocation beyond conventional political contribution channels.

We examine the impact of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) on bank liquidity hoarding. We create a comprehensive measure of bank liquidity hoarding that takes into account asset-, liability-, and off-balance sheet activities. Using over one million bank-quarter observations, we find that in response to EPU, banks hoard liquidity overall and through all three components. This behavior is more pronounced for banks with less liquidity, more peer-bank spillover effects, and more EPU exposure. Additional analyses of interest rate spreads on several bank products suggest that our findings reflect at least in part bank choices, rather than just the reactions of customers.

We investigate the effects of countercyclical prudential buffers on bank risk-taking. We exploit the introduction of dynamic loan loss provisioning in Spain, mandating that banks use historical average loss rates in their estimation of loan loss provisions. We find that dynamic loan loss provisioning is associated with reductions in timely loan loss provisioning. Banks that previously recognized loan losses in a timely fashion exhibit the greatest reductions in timeliness and consequently extend loans to riskier borrowers with lower accounting quality. Our results have policy implications for the debate on the use of financial reporting requirements in mitigating capital pro-cyclicality.

Using firm-level data for 42 countries over 1991-2016, we show that the extent to which credit flows to relatively risker firms—which we label riskiness of credit allocation—is a distinct dimension of the credit cycle that helps predict downside risks to GDP growth and financial stress episodes, one to three years ahead, even after controlling for the magnitude of credit expansions and for financial conditions. The riskiness of credit allocation is both a measure of corporate vulnerability and of investor sentiment, but its predictive power does not simply come from its relation to these correlates of future financial stress.

Using a comprehensive dataset from German banks, we document the usage of sovereign credit default swaps (CDS) during the European sovereign debt crisis of 2008–2013. Banks used the sovereign CDS market to extend, rather than hedge, their long exposures to sovereign risk during this period. Lower loan exposure to sovereign risk is associated with greater protection selling in CDS, the effect being weaker when sovereign risk is high. Bank and country risk variables are mostly not associated with protection selling. The findings are driven by the actions of a few non-dealer banks which sold CDS protection aggressively at the onset of the crisis, but started covering their positions at its height while simultaneously shifting their assets towards sovereign bonds and loans. Our findings underscore the importance of accounting for derivatives exposure in building a complete picture and understanding fully the economic drivers of the bank-sovereign nexus of risk.

We document the effects of the COVID−19 pandemic on digital finance and fintech adoption. Drawing on mobile application data from a globally representative sample, we find that the spread of COVID− 19 and related government lockdowns led to a sizeable increase in the rate of finance app downloads. We then analyze factors that may have driven this effect on the demand−side and better understand the “winners” from this digital acceleration on the supply−side. Our overall results suggest that traditional incumbents saw the largest growth in their digital offerings during the initial period, but that “BigTech” companies and newer fintech providers ultimately outperformed them over time. Finally, we drill−down further on the adoption of fintech apps pertaining to both the asset and liability side of the traditional bank balance sheet, to explore the implications that the accelerated trends in digitization may have for the future landscape of financial intermediation.

This paper proposes a theory of redemption runs based on strategic information acquisition by fund managers. We argue that liquidity lines provided by third parties can be a source of financial fragility, as they incentivize fund managers to acquire private information about the value of their assets. This strategic information acquisition can lead to inefficient market liquidity dry-ups caused by self-fulfilling fears of adverse selection. By lowering asset prices, information acquisition also reduces the value of funds’ assets-under-management and may spur inefficient redemption runs by investors. Two different regimes can arise: one in which funds’ information acquisition incentives are unaffected by the volume of redemptions, and another where market and funding liquidity risk mutually reinforce each other.

We examine the relationship between institutional ownership and bank capital. Using a large sample of U.S. banks, we show that banks with greater institutional ownership operate with substantially higher capital ratios. The results are robust to controlling for standard determinants of bank capital structure, including market- and accounting-based risk measures. The results hold both for indexers and non-indexers, indicating that the effect of institutional ownership on bank capital cannot be explained by self-selection. We further address endogeneity concerns using an instrumental variable strategy based on the inclusion of banks in the S&P index. We find supporting evidence that the superior monitoring abilities of institutional investors, which reduce the severity of agency costs, is the main explanation for our results.