Knowledge that Transforms

The paper examines a continuous-time delegated monitoring problem between competitive investors and an impatient bank monitoring a pool of long-term loans subject to Markovian “contagion.” Moral hazard induces a foreclosure bias unless the bank is compensated with the right incentive-compatible contract. Fees are paid when the bank’s performance is on target and liquidation arises when the bank’s performance is sufficiently poor. I show that the optimal contract can be implemented with a whole loan sale involving both credit risk retention based on ABS credit default swaps and credit enhancement in the form of a reserve account. The optimal securitization bears out rulemaking recently proposed in the wake of the Dodd-Frank Act on a number of controversial provisions. I argue that further efficiency gains could be reaped by extending the role of the “premium capture” account into a liquidity buffer capturing performance-based compensation as a way of increasing skin in the game over the life of the transaction.

Positive co-movements in bank leverage and assets are associated with leverage procyclicality. As wholesale funding allows banks to quickly adjust leverage, banks with wholesale funding are expected to exhibit higher leverage procyclicality. Using Canadian data, we analyze (i) if leverage procyclicality exists and its dependence on wholesale funding, (ii) market factors associated with this procyclicality, and (iii) if banking-sector leverage procyclicality forecasts market volatility. The findings suggest that procyclicality exists and that its degree positively depends on use of wholesale funding. Furthermore, funding-market liquidity matters for this procyclicality. Finally, banking-sector leverage procyclicality can forecast volatility in the equity market.