Knowledge that Transforms

We use bank-firm matched data to study how the capital buffers that large U.S. banks must satisfy to “pass” the Federal Reserve's stress tests impact banks’ lending and firms’ loan volumes, overall debt, investment, and employment. We find that larger stress-test capital buffers lead to reductions in banks’ lending, modest increases in loan rates and spreads, and reductions in new loan originations. However, we do not find an impact of higher capital buffers on firms’ overall debt, investment, and employment, suggesting that firms find other credit sources to substitute for the reduction in loans from banks that participate in the stress tests.

When will a policy authority (PA) resolve a bank whose solvency is uncertain? Delaying resolution gives the PA time to obtain information about the bank’s solvency. Delaying resolution also gives creditors time to withdraw funds, raising the cost of bailing out depositors. The optimal resolution date trades off these costs with the option value of making a more efficient resolution decision given new information. Providing liquidity support buys the PA time to wait for information, but increases its losses if the bank turns out to be insolvent. The PA may therefore optimally delay the provision of liquidity support.

We empirically examine how venture capitalists adjust coinvestor relationships over time. We identify a fundamental trade-off where the benefits of familiarity are weighed against the opportunity costs of coinvesting with other syndication partners. Using US data, we find that venture capitalists dynamically adjust their relationship intensities by gradually disengaging from overly deep relationships. More centrally networked investors are more cautious with disengaging. In hot investment markets investors disengage more readily from existing relationships, but new relationships forged in hot market are less enduring. Perhaps surprisingly, we find a negative relationship between deeper prior relationships and investment performance.

Security design, which broadly speaking deals with the issue of designing optimal contractual mechanisms for overcoming various frictions between agents, is the subject of an extensive literature. This paper presents a review of recent work on security design and is organized around the applications of security design in various fields of finance starting with classic corporate finance applications such as capital structure and corporate governance, financial intermediation applications such as securitization and contingent capital, the interaction of market and security design, as well as emerging applications such as fintech, sustainable finance and healthcare finance. Future research is also discussed.

Banks take costly actions (such as capitalization, liquidity holding, and advanced risk management) to avoid financial distress and creditor runs. While directly affecting a bank’s risks, such actions can also signal the bank’s fundamentals. We show that prudential regulations have an informational impact: sufficiently tight regulations can eliminate inefficient separating equilibria in banks’ signaling game, thereby changing the information available to creditors and their incentives to run. When accounting for this informational impact, tightening regulations can improve banks’ payoffs and be considered bank incentive-compatible. We support this novel, information-based rationale for regulations with evidence from the US liquidity requirement.

Low monetary policy rates lower the cost of capital for firms, thereby spurring productive investment. Low interest rates however can also induce the private sector to enter into risky carry trades when they imply that the earned carry more than offsets liquidity risk. Such carry trades and productive investment compete for funds, so much so that the former may crowd out the latter. Below an endogenous lower bound, monetary easing generates only limited capital expenditures that come at the cost of large and destabilizing financial risk-taking. Absent the ability to regulate carry trades, monetary easing must be complemented with a restrictive emergency-lending policy in the form of higher lending rates so as to discourage risk-taking by relatively illiquid firms. Monetary easing, tepid investment response, and rollover risk for liquid firms then arise jointly (and optimally) in equilibrium.

Lenders’ simultaneous equity holdings introduce conflicts of interest among members of syndicated loans. We argue that lenders address such within-syndicate conflicts with financial covenant design to improve contracting efficiency. We show that loans with higher conflicts rely less on performance-based covenants, which serve as tripwires to facilitate ex-post control transfer and require coordination among syndicate members. Instead, high-conflict loans rely more on capital-based covenants to align shareholder-creditor interest ex-ante and incentivize shareholder monitoring. Overall, these results suggest that such conflicts can reduce capital flexibility and renegotiation efficiency for the borrowers.

This study aims to examine whether religion influences branch banking. Using a large sample of U.S. county-level branch banking and religious characteristics data between 1994 and 2018, we find that the local religiosity of the bank headquarters’ region is positively related to the presence of bank branches. By contrast, banks in regions with more Catholics than Protestants are less likely to have branches. Moreover, religious diversity negatively affects branch banking. Overall, our study highlights the significant role of local religions in branch-banking decisions.

Before the Covid-19 crisis, zero-bank-debt firms, especially risky ones, faced, due to their lack of credit history, more difficult access to bank loans than firms which previously had bank debt. These credit constraints were tightened by the Covid shock, irrespective of firms’ risk, arguably because of increased information asymmetries during a period of high macroeconomic uncertainty. Zero-bank-debt firms, even those which were safe and profitable, were also far more likely to leave the market during the pandemic than firms which previously had bank debt. However, those zero-bank-debt firms that did obtain new credit reduced their probability of exit.