We examine the effect of credit default swaps (CDSs) on debt specialization. We argue that reference firms in CDS contracts, seeking to minimize creditor conflicts and bankruptcy costs, exhibit higher debt concentration than firms on which no CDSs are traded. Our results show that firms engage in greater debt specialization and are more likely to specialize following the inception of CDS trading. Additionally, we find that, while lender concentration in firms increases, the number of bank lenders drops, lead arranger share rises, and the probability that lead arrangers and lenders are repeated increases following the onset of CDS trading. Our results are robust to instrumental variable estimation, propensity-score matching, different model specifications, and different subsamples

Using regulatory data on CDS holdings and corporate bond transactions, I provide evidence for a liquidity spillover effect from CDS to bond markets. Bond trading volumes are 70% larger for investors with CDS positions written on the debt issuer. Moreover, higher CDS trading activity substantially improves the liquidity of the underlying bonds, particularly around rating downgrades. Additional analyses reveal that the spillover effect is partly driven by naked CDS positions, highlighting one of the adverse consequences of naked CDS bans for bond markets. The results suggest that the presence of an accessible CDS market enhances the liquidity of the underlying bond market.

We theorize and confirm a new channel by means of which liquidity costs are embedded in CDS spreads. We show that credit default swap (CDS) spreads are directly related to equity market liquidity in the Merton [Merton, R.C., 1974. On the pricing of corporate debt: The risk structure of interest rates. J. Finance 29, 449–470] model via hedging. We confirm this relationship empirically using a sample of 1452 quarterly CDS spreads over 2001–2005. In the model, this relationship is monotone increasing when credit quality worsens. These results are robust to alternative measures of equity liquidity and other possible determinants of CDS spreads

Recent studies provide strong evidence that credit default swap (CDS) markets play a leading role in information intermediation. This paper proposes a model to rationalize the information transmission mechanism between the CDS and equity markets. In our model, informed traders with an informational advantage obtained from monitoring credit markets engage in capital structure arbitrage and trade strategically to exploit mispricings between individual stocks and CDS. In line with our model’s prediction, our empirical results provide evidence of a contemporaneous channel transmitting structural CDS shocks to equities. A positive shock to CDS decreases stock returns contemporaneously and over the long run. This credit-to-equity channel dominates the reverse transmission channel from stocks to CDS. Robustness tests confirm the role of the CDS market as a preferred venue for informed trading, independently of credit rating events or business sectors

Using a comprehensive dataset from German banks, we document the usage of sovereign credit default swaps (CDS) during the European sovereign debt crisis of 2008–2013. Banks used the sovereign CDS market to extend, rather than hedge, their long exposures to sovereign risk during this period. Lower loan exposure to sovereign risk is associated with greater protection selling in CDS, the effect being weaker when sovereign risk is high. Bank and country risk variables are mostly not associated with protection selling. The findings are driven by the actions of a few non-dealer banks which sold CDS protection aggressively at the onset of the crisis, but started covering their positions at its height while simultaneously shifting their assets towards sovereign bonds and loans. Our findings underscore the importance of accounting for derivatives exposure in building a complete picture and understanding fully the economic drivers of the bank-sovereign nexus of risk

We construct a measure of a bank's relative creditworthiness from the Eurosystem's proprietary inter-bank loan data: average overnight borrowing rate relative to an overnight rate index (AOR). We then investigate the dynamic relationship between AOR and the credit default swap price relative to the corresponding market index of 60 banks during 2008–2013. Price discovery mainly takes place in the CDS market, but AOR also contributes to it. The lagged daily changes of AOR help predict CDS. This indicates that AOR includes private information, which the CDS market does not immediately incorporate. We further show that the private information advantage is concentrated on days of market stress and on banks, which mainly borrow from relationship lender banks. Such borrower banks are typically smaller, have weaker ratings, and are likely to reside in crisis countries. Competent authorities can use AOR as a complementary indicator of banks’ concurrent health

We construct a novel dataset that matches bank holding company credit default swap (CDS) positions to detailed U.S. credit registry data containing both loan and corporate bond holdings by large U.S. banks. The dataset sheds new light on how banks use CDS, and what effects, if any, CDS use has on corporate credit risk. We show that few banks insure loans, even loans of distressed borrowers, suggesting that empty creditor problems among banks are not widespread. We find that banks are more likely to sell than buy CDS when they have a lending relationship with CDS firms. We then create new aggregate measures of hedging activity based on position-level data to test the empty creditor hypothesis. Contrary to existing studies, aggregate measures of credit risk hedging that do not condition on lending relationships overstate bank hedging activity. Furthermore, our regression results do not find any evidence that firm credit risk is adversely impacted when banks in particular purchase CDS

The paper examines a continuous-time delegated monitoring problem between competitive investors and an impatient bank monitoring a pool of long-term loans subject to Markovian “contagion.” Moral hazard induces a foreclosure bias unless the bank is compensated with the right incentive-compatible contract. Fees are paid when the bank’s performance is on target and liquidation arises when the bank’s performance is sufficiently poor. I show that the optimal contract can be implemented with a whole loan sale involving both credit risk retention based on ABS credit default swaps and credit enhancement in the form of a reserve account. The optimal securitization bears out rulemaking recently proposed in the wake of the Dodd-Frank Act on a number of controversial provisions. I argue that further efficiency gains could be reaped by extending the role of the “premium capture” account into a liquidity buffer capturing performance-based compensation as a way of increasing skin in the game over the life of the transaction

What market features of financial risk transfer exacerbate counterparty risk? To analyze this, we formulate a model which elucidates important differences between financial risk transfer and traditional insurance, using the example of Credit Default Swaps (CDS). We allow for (heterogeneous) insurer insolvency, which captures the possibility that relatively risky counterparties may exist in the market. Further, we find that stable insurers become less stable as the price of the contract decreases. The analysis includes insured parties that have heterogeneous motivations for purchasing CDS. For example, some may own the underlying asset and purchase CDS for risk management, while others buy these contracts purely for trading purposes. We show that traders will choose to contract with less stable insurers, resulting in higher counterparty risk in this market relative to that of traditional insurance; however, a regulatory policy that removes traders can, perversely, cause stable counterparties to become less stable. We conclude with two extensions of the model that consider a Central Counterparty (CCP) arrangement and the consequences of asymmetric information over insurer type