This paper investigates whether competition affects the degree of optimism in recommendations on Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) issued by affiliated sell-side analysts. Competition is measured by the number of unaffiliated analysts covering the IPO. Since the measure of competition is likely to be endogenous, it is instrumented using the number of analysts who cover stocks in the same industry as the IPO, one quarter before the one in which the recommendation is issued. The results show that affiliated analysts issue less optimistic recommendations when more unaffiliated analysts cover the IPO, suggesting that competition has a causal effect in mitigating the incentives of affiliated analysts to issue favorable investment recommendations. The paper also shows that recommendations issued by analysts affiliated with co-managers of the IPO are significantly less optimistic than those issued by analysts affiliated with the lead underwriter, and that competition affects only the degree of optimism of the latter.

Using data from the Italian Credit Register we identify the adverse effect of the freeze of the securitization market on bank lending during the crisis of 2007–2008. Applying a differences-in-differences estimation to data on firms that borrow from multiple banks, we single out credit supply by including firm fixed effects. Our results show that the degree to which banks tightened credit supply to nonfinancial firms is positively related to the share of loans they securitized before the crisis. The tightening translated into lower credit growth, higher interest rates, lower probability of accepting loan applications and higher probability of relationship termination. Firms were unable to fully compensate the negative credit supply shock, which suggests that the securitization freeze played a role in reducing aggregate credit availability.

This paper studies the real effects of relationship lending on firm activity in Italy following Lehman Brothers’ default shock and Europe's sovereign debt crisis, two different crisis situations where in the latter, bank solvency was at the centre of the economic shock while being more peripheral in the former. We use a large data set that merges the comprehensive Italian Credit and Firm Registers. We find that following Lehman's default, banks offered more favourable continuation lending terms to firms with which they had stronger relationships. Such favourable conditions enabled firms to maintain higher levels of investment and employment. The insulation effects of tighter bank-firm relationships were still present during the European sovereign debt crisis, especially for firms tied to well capitalised banks.