This paper examines how government ownership and government involvement in a country’s banking system affect bank performance from 1989 through 2004. Our study uncovers an interesting pattern of changing performance differences between state-owned and privately-owned banks around the Asian financial crisis. We find that state-owned banks operated less profitably, held less core capital, and had greater credit risk than privately-owned banks prior to 2001, and the performance differences are more significant in those countries with greater government involvement and political corruption in the banking system. In addition, from 1997 to 2000, the 4-year period after the beginning of the Asian financial crisis, the deterioration in the cash flow returns, core capital, and credit quality of state-owned banks was significantly greater than that of privately-owned banks, especially for the countries that were hardest hit by the Asian crisis. However, state-owned banks closed the gap with privately-owned banks on cash flow returns, core capital, and nonperforming loans in the post-crisis period of 2001–2004. Our findings can best be explained by Shleifer and Vishny’s [Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 1997. A survey of corporate governance. J. Finance 52, 737–783] corporate governance theory on state ownership of firms and Kane’s [Kane, E.J., 2000. Capital movement, banking insolvency, and silent runs in the Asian financial crisis. Pacific-Basin Finance J. 8, 153–175] life-cycle model of a regulation-induced banking crisis.

Examining bank behavior around Federal Reserve stress tests, we find that stress test banks increase capital ratios at the starting point for annual stress testing significantly more than non-stress test banks. These trends are completely reversed (and economically significant) in the other quarters. Further, the differences between stress test and non-stress test banks seen in stress test years do not occur in 2010, when the Fed did not conduct a stress test. Results show that, as they enter the stress test, stress test banks lower dividends significantly more than non-stress test banks. Finally, stress test banks spend significantly more on lobbying than non-stress test banks. The results suggest that stress test banks may be managing financial performance and investing in political spending to improve their chances of passing stress tests.