We use bank-firm matched data to study how the capital buffers that large U.S. banks must satisfy to “pass” the Federal Reserve's stress tests impact banks’ lending and firms’ loan volumes, overall debt, investment, and employment. We find that larger stress-test capital buffers lead to reductions in banks’ lending, modest increases in loan rates and spreads, and reductions in new loan originations. However, we do not find an impact of higher capital buffers on firms’ overall debt, investment, and employment, suggesting that firms find other credit sources to substitute for the reduction in loans from banks that participate in the stress tests.

Short sale constraints prior to seasoned equity offers, imposed by Rule 10b-21 in 1988, are believed to compromise pricing efficiency and contribute to the large temporal increase in offer price discounting. This study provides additional insights by examining shelf-registered offers, which were exempt from pre-issue short sale constraints until 2004. The results suggest that pre-issue short sale constraints do not influence the level of discounting in seasoned equity offers. Moreover, this study reports that the recent temporal increase in discounting is due to a greater prevalence of overnight shelf offers, which are associated with relatively large offer price discounts.

I address the “decimalization” debate, i.e., whether trading on cent ticks rather than fractions of a dollar reduces trading costs without diminishing liquidity. I use Toronto Stock Exchange data following their switch to decimal trading on April 15, 1996. For stocks whose minimum tick was reduced from one-eighth of a dollar to five cents, decimalization reduced spreads, while liquidity was not adversely affected. Investors' trading costs and liquidity providers' profits declined on average, but trading volume did not increase. For stocks whose minimum tick size declined from 5 cents to 1 cent, decimalization had little impact on market quality.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: G12, G15

Investment advisory firms and brokerage firms hire analysts to uncover profitable securities investment opportunities. Then these firms sell the information (either directly or indirectly) to others. Why? Given that the information has value, why do these firms not keep the information to themselves and trade solely for their own accounts? Because of competition, information is more valuable when fewer people trade on the information. This paper shows that selling information is a strategic response by competing informed traders. Specifically, it is a means for informed traders to commit to trade aggressively, thereby inducing other informed traders to trade less aggressively. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G10, D82.

We develop a model of the dynamic interaction between CEO overconfidence and dividend policy. The model shows that an overconfident CEO views external financing as costly and hence builds financial slack for future investment needs by lowering the current dividend payout. Consistent with the main prediction, we find that the level of dividend payout is about one-sixth lower in firms managed by CEOs who are more likely to be overconfident. We document that this reduction in dividends associated with CEO overconfidence is greater in firms with lower growth opportunities and lower cash flow. We also show that the magnitude of the positive market reaction to a dividend-increase announcement is higher for firms with greater uncertainty about CEO overconfidence.

The Credit Card Accountability and Disclosure Act (CARD Act) of 2009 restricted several risk management practices of credit card issuers. Using a quasi-experimental design with credit bureau data on consumer lending, we find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the act's restrictions on risk management practices contributed to a large decline in bank card holding by higher risk, nonprime consumers but had little effect on prime consumers. Looking at consumer finance loans, historically a source of credit for higher risk consumers, we find greater reliance on such loans by nonprime consumers in states with high consumer finance rate ceilings following the CARD Act than by nonprime consumers in states with low rate ceilings or by prime consumers. That nonprime consumers in states with high consumer finance rate ceilings relied more heavily on consumer finance loans suggests that consumer finance loans were a substitute for subprime credit cards for risky consumers when rate ceilings permit such loans to be profitable. Consumer finance loans would not be available to many higher risk, nonprime consumers in low rate states because such loans would be unprofitable, and prime consumers would not need consumer finance loans because other less expensive types of credit would generally be available to them.

This paper surveys the growing literature on payments. We begin by presenting a simple model that illustrates the essential function of payments and how this may be implemented through various arrangements. We show how the basic models of payments have been used to address a variety of microeconomic and macroeconomic policy issues. We then discuss the links between payments economics and other fields, including monetary theory, corporate finance, and industrial organization. We conclude with an overview of the empirical literature and directions for future research.

Increased awareness of the importance of non-bank financial infrastructures has brought increased concern about the potential for bailouts and the resultant moral hazard problem. This paper examines the question with regard to derivatives central counterparties. We consider the layers of protection that derivatives central clearing parties (CCPs) have established in the absence of an expectation of regulatory rescue. We then provide a model of the tension between the desire for ex post rescue of a systemically important financial infrastructure and the desire to maintain ex ante discipline on the infrastructure. The model illustrates the factors that should lead to relaxation or tightening of the financial regulator's discretion for rescue. We consider examples of failures of derivatives CCPs in order to highlight the importance of these considerations.

Dealers enter nonbinding expressions of interest during the Nasdaq preopening to promote price discovery and ease stock inventory management when the market opens. But does this practice of “indicating ahead” constitute best execution for an individual customer? Arguments in favor of the practice rely on the notion that best execution is a general condition as opposed to a concept applicable on a trade-by-trade basis. Some customers must sacrifice in individual instances to improve the functioning of the overall market. But the practice of indicating ahead violates the dealer agent's duty of loyalty to her individual customer. Moreover, the dealer's financial self-interest is best served by indicating ahead. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G10, G18, K22.

The standard Principal–Agent (PA) model assumes that the principal can control the agent's consumption profile. In an intertemporal setting, however, Rogerson (1985, Econometrica53, 69–76) shows that given the optimal PA contract, the agent has an unmet precautionary demand for savings. Thus the standard PA model is invalid if the agent has access to credit markets. In this paper we generalize the standard PA model to allow for saving and borrowing by the agent. We show that the impact of such access critically depends upon the treatment of default. If default is not permitted, efficiency is strictly reduced by the introduction of credit markets, and the equilibrium level of borrowing or saving is indeterminate in the model. If default is allowed, however, the optimal contract depends upon the level of bankruptcy protection in the economy, which is described by a minimum level of wage income. We show that there is an optimal intermediate range of bankruptcy protection. Within this range, allowing default increases efficiency in the economy relative to the case of no default. Also, the model predicts specific levels of consumer debt, interest rates, and default rates as functions of the level of bankruptcy protection level. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D80, G21, G28, J30.