The most recently issued, on-the-run, Treasuries are extremely liquid and frequently trade at a premium in both the cash and repo, or financing, markets. Previous research suggests that both the cash and repo premiums reflect demand from buy-and-hold investors who value the superior liquidity of these securities and are reluctant to lend them in the repo market. We find evidence that premiums in the repo market are also closely related to market participants’ demand to hedge interest rate risk associated with their holdings of fixed income securities.

Bookbuilding, the dominant offering mechanism for IPOs, is controversial because of the power it gives underwriters over IPO allocations. Critics argue that allocations could be abused to generate kickbacks for underwriters while proponents hold that allocation power could improve pre-market price discovery. We examine underpricing, bidding, and allocations from two regimes in the Indian IPO market with varying underwriter allocation power. When underwriters control allocations, bookbuilding is associated with lesser underpricing, but the effect quickly dissipates when regulations withdraw allocation powers. Using proprietary datasets of IPO books in both regimes, we find that allocation powers are used quite extensively. Identical bids can receive significantly different allocations, which depend not only on the bid but also on the bidder identity. When allocation powers are withdrawn, we find evidence of bidder exit, new bidder entry, and altered bidding strategies with exit by both favored and unfavored bidders. Our evidence supports bookbuilding theories in which giving underwriters allocation powers assists in pre-market price discovery.

Using an effort-sharing framework for VC syndicates, we assess how syndication impacts investment returns, chances of successful exit, and the time taken to exit. With data from 1980 to 2003, and applying apposite econometrics for endogeneity to these different performance measures, we are able to ascribe much of the better return to selection, with the value-addition by monitoring role significantly impacting the likelihood and time of exit. While the extant literature on Venture Capital (VC) syndication is divided about the relative importance of the “selection” and “value-add” hypotheses, we find that their roles are complementary.