Discussions about insider trading regulation veer between the poles of forbidding insider trading to protect market integrity and allowing insider trading to foster informational efficiency. We study traders’ preferences for regulation by offering them concurrent markets with different regulatory regimes in an experimental setting. We find that informed traders’ preference for the unregulated market causes both informed and uninformed traders to be more active in the unregulated market. This market, thus, sees more trading volume, lower spreads, and less mispricing. Nevertheless, uninformed traders suffer greater losses in unregulated markets, while informed traders profit from the absence of regulation

According to recent theoretical work, a more transparent and precise benchmark assessment should positively impact liquidity in the underlying market. We exploit a benchmark regime change in the $289 trillion interest rate swaps market to test this prediction. Utilizing proprietary electronic order book data, we find improved liquidity effects in the USD swaps market following the transition to the regulated ICE Swap Rate. Regulations that improve the methodology and oversight of benchmarks can, therefore, impact markets positively. Conservative estimates of direct savings in a single swap tenor on one trading platform are in the region of $4 million - $7 million