Monetary policy became more difficult to characterize during and after the mortgage foreclose and financial crises because of a shift to a new credit policy focused on private sector credit and that relies on traditional commercial banking strategies. The new credit policy broke the tight link that had existed between Fed credit and its effective monetary base, the monetary base that affects monetary aggregates. The Fed has adopted an exit strategy, but the discretionary powers that it followed remain in place as does a mistaken policy on the payment of interest on excess reserves.

This article empirically tests the hypothesis that credit-screening standards can be first increasing and then decreasing in the quality of the bank's pool of potential borrowers, which in turn may vary through the business cycle or across different segments of the lending markets. A key implication is that banks with lending opportunities toward the middle of the quality spectrum can have loan portfolios that perform better than do the portfolios of banks with loan-origination opportunities that are either too weak or too strong. Using banks’ volume of secondary-market loan sales as a proxy for the richness of lending opportunities, I find an inverse U-shaped relation between the performance of banks’ loan portfolios and their activity in the loan sales market. The pattern deserves scrutiny for its policy implications, as many regulators hold the view that countercyclical variation in credit standards may have a destabilizing effect on business cycles.

In this paper we model the derivative strategies optimally undertaken by a manager (or head of a profit center in a hedge fund) when the detailed derivative positions taken are not contractible. We show that with commonly-used incentive features in the compensation structure, managers have incentives to implement complex derivative strategies that lead to a slight reduction in default probabilities (or a slight increase in performance measures) with a high probability at the cost of allowing for the possibility of disaster states involving large losses, although with a very small probability. Such disaster states cause systemic instability (similar to the experience of Long-Term Capital Management in September 1998). We discuss possible audit strategies, governance mechanisms and incentive structures that will ameliorate the probability of systemic instability arising from such incentives in a market with a rich enough menu of derivatives. We characterize the optimal intensity of audit effort with and without the presence of such derivative strategies. The dependence of the optimal audit intensity on the legal liability regime and different rules for apportioning the auditor's liability is derived. Our results also relate the optimal audit intensity to the cost and efficiency parameters of the audit firm.

This paper contributes to the empirical literature on risk shifting. It proposes a method to find out whether risk shifting is present in the banking industry and, if so, what type. The type of risk shifting depends on the group of debt holders to whom risk is shifted. We apply this method to the US banking sector in 1998–2011. To study the relationship between risk shifting and the 2008 crisis, the sample is also split into pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis periods. Our results suggest that the same type of risk shifting is present in the entire sample and in the pre-crisis and crisis subsamples. We find no evidence of risk shifting after the crisis. Furthermore, holding capital buffers seems to disincentivize risk shifting. This finding appears to provide support for the conservative buffer included in Basel III.

This paper examines the implications that alternative regulatory structures may have for resolving failed banking institutions. Emphasis on the European Union (EU), which is both economically and financially large and has several features relating to cross-border banking in the form of direct investment that may heighten the problems we consider. To ensure the efficient resolution of bank failures with minimum, if any, credit and liquidity losses a four step program should be followed. This includes prompt legal closure of institutions before they become economically insolvent, prompt identification of claims and assignment of losses, prompt reopening of failed institutions, and prompt re-capitalizing and re-privatization of failed institutions. These policies together with a prompt corrective action system could be voluntarily adopted through the use of deposit insurance premium discounts as an incentive.

Although the world of banking and finance is becoming more integrated every day, in most aspects the world of financial regulation continues to be narrowly defined by national boundaries. The main players here are still national governments and governmental agencies. And until recently, they tended to follow a policy of shielding their activities from scrutiny by their peers and members of the academic community rather than inviting critical assessments and an exchange of ideas. The turbulence in international financial markets in the 1980s, and its impact on US banks, gave rise to the notion that academics working in the field of banking and financial regulation might be in a position to make a contribution to the improvement of regulation in the United States, and thus ultimately to the stability of the entire financial sector. This provided the impetus for the creation of the “US Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee”. In the meantime, similar shadow committees have been founded in Europe, Japan and Latin America. The specific problems associated with financial regulation in Europe, as well as the specific features which distinguish the European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (ESFRC) from its counterparts in the US and Japan, derive from the fact that while Europe has already made substantial progress towards economic and political integration, it is still primarily a collection of distinct nation–states with differing institutional set-ups and political and economic traditions. Therefore, any attempt to work towards a European approach to financial regulation must include an effort to promote the development of a European culture of co-operation in this area, and this is precisely what the European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee seeks to do. In this paper, Harald Benink, chairman of the ESFRC, and Reinhard H. Schmidt, one of the two German members, discuss the origin, the objectives and the functioning of the committee and the thrust of its recommendations.

This paper exploits changes in financial subsidy programs to investigate their effect on female employment and firm performance. The identification strategy uses a quasi-experiment from a government policy change that eliminated financial support for exporting plants in the Chilean manufacturing industry. The difference-in-differences methodology shows that the policy change increased the share of total female employment by 3.3%, driven mainly by an increase of female workers in blue-collar occupations. In comparison, male labor experienced a drop of 4.4% in white-collar occupations in the treated plants relative to those in the control group. Plant total factor productivity (TFP) decreased due to the policy change, but both total gross output and sales rose approximately 7% on average. The paper explores two possible mechanisms to explain these findings: the technology adoption channel and changes in the gender composition of labor in the presence of a gender pay gap. The findings are consistent with the international trade and corporate finance literature on firm behavior under high market fixed and sunk costs.

We examine the determinants of investor flows into, and the potential market fragility imposed by, U.S. municipal bond mutual funds. We find that funds have a linear flow-performance relationship that is consistent with effective liquidity management strategies. Funds use liquid holdings to partially offset net redemptions, but trade municipal bonds in proportion to flows. Funds increase their liquid holdings after flow volatility increases. The fact that funds use a vertical slice approach as a primary strategy is not surprising because they maintain small amounts of liquid securities. Our evidence is consistent with investors not being concerned with municipal bond mutual funds promoting run-risk.

This paper studies how the Greek sovereign credit event in March 2012 impacted the credit default swap (CDS) market from market-wide and investor behaviour perspectives, using both network tools to a dataset of snapshots of the global bilateral CDS exposures and a panel analysis on CDS spreads. Regarding the CDS spreads, we find very little discernible direct impact of the Greek credit event on CDS spreads overall. This finding provides some further evidence that the Greek credit event was well anticipated by most market participants. However, we find several significant changes in the Greek CDS network structure following the credit event: the number of connections via exposures declined significantly, the directionality of the positions (net long vs net short) of the main groups of market participants reversed, while none of the non-banks returned to trade Greek CDSs until the last observation of dataset (October 2014). Regarding indirect effects to other CDS markets, we find evidence of temporary spill-over effects on CDS reference entities with credit risk associated with the risk of the Greek sovereign. In particular, the market and counterparty structures changed temporarily with all types of traders decreasing their exposures to the EU periphery sovereign reference entities and also changing their trading counterparties, while after some time, the structure of the market returned to a similar one observed before the credit event. Finally, we find some support for the bank-sovereign nexus, as there was a consistent retreat from the CDS exposures on banks in the EU periphery countries, contrary to banks residing in the other EU countries.