This paper explores how banks’ environmental, social, and governance (ESG) activities affect their lending during financial crises. We use a sample of European listed banks with available ESG scores from 2002 to 2020 and consider the global financial crisis of 2007–2009 and the European sovereign debt crisis of 2010–2012. We estimate a two-step system GMM dynamic panel data model and also address potential endogeneity with instrumental variable (IV) and difference-in-difference (DiD) estimations. We find that lending falls to a lesser extent for banks with higher ESG scores during crisis times. Our findings are robust to using alternative ESG rating providers. An investigation of the different potential channels shows that, during crises, banks more engaged in ESG activities are less affected in terms of credit risk, asset risk, and profitability. They also face a lower reduction in market funding, allowing them to downsize to a lesser extent during crises, and their deposit rates do not increase as much as in less ESG-engaged banks. A deeper investigation reveals that our findings mainly hold for banks focused on traditional lending and deposit activities and are essentially driven by the environmental pillar component of ESG scores and the global financial crisis of 2007–2009.

This paper investigates the impact of banks’ political connections on their ability to collect deposits under two different deposit insurance regimes (blanket guarantee and limited guarantee). We use a unique hand-collected dataset that identifies the political connections of Indonesian commercial banks, from Q1:2002 to Q2:2008. We find that, regardless of their type (state-owned or private entities), politically connected banks are able to attract deposits more easily than their non-connected counterparts. We also show that this effect is more pronounced after the implementation of formal deposit insurance with limited coverage. Our findings have various policy implications. Formal deposit insurance might have improved market discipline, as highlighted by earlier studies, but it has also exacerbated the issue of political connections in the banking sector.

We empirically investigate how bank internationalization, organizational complexity, and geographical complexity stemming from foreign-affiliate type and geographic dispersion affect parent bank stability and profitability. We base our analysis on unique, hand-collected data for the worldwide locations of subsidiaries and branches of EU banks. Our results show that internationalization benefits bank stability by reducing default risk, and it is significantly associated with lower earnings volatility but poorer profitability. With regard to foreign organizational complexity, banks with both foreign subsidiaries and foreign branches are more stable than banks with foreign branches exclusively, which are more stable than banks with only foreign subsidiaries. Nevertheless, higher geographic complexity is associated with lower default risk, higher volatility in earnings, and higher profitability. Further investigations on the sovereign debt crisis and bank size indicate that the sovereign debt crisis in 2011 amplified the relationship and our findings mainly hold for small banks.